While often a lawyer named 'James' I am also sometimes a podcast cohost called 'Peach'.Here is an episode of a podcast I cohost all about the Gordon Ramsay reality TV phenomenon 'Kitchen Nightmares'.It's playful, it's in depth, and I hope it gives you a new insight into what I get up to alongside law.If you enjoy it, please give it a subscribe! ___You can find the podcast here: https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/the-nightmare-method/id1733972953

It's time for another great fun appearance on Jordan and Nathan's podcast, Challenge the Standard.We cover it all!- The progress of Gravamen- Intersectionality- The value of community- Sponsoring a sports team- The worst tech stuff up CACN has encountered!___You can find the Challenge the Standard podcast here: https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/challenge-the-standard-in-financial-advice/id1725733771

“Who pays the legal fees for the property sale and the partnership windup?”___A recent, short decision concerned a s 66G application for the sale of a property and a winding up of the partnership that owned it: [2]In 1991 the partnership was formed between a sibling, some companies, and the deceased. The parties to the proceedings were the partners and some of the deceased’s children: [3]In 2022 the deceased died.At the time of the hearing, the deceased’s stake in the property was held by the deceased’s executors: [4]An accusation of “foot-dragging” on the part of the Ds coloured the Ps’ approach: [8]The Ps commenced proceedings seeking the appointment of s 66G trustees and for the winding up of the partnership: [2]The parties reached agreement that the orders sought ought to be made: [5]Unresolved was the question of legal costs: [6]The Ps took the view that the Ds’ foot-dragging conduct was unreasonable, thereby inviting the litigation. Based on this – the Ps said – the Ps should have their costs from residue but the Ds should not: [8]The Ds said the normal position ought to be maintained, that their conduct did not warrant a departure from it (noting the negotiations engaged in over the course of the matter): [9]The Court considered the usual position as to costs in a s 66G application and a partnership dissolution – absent an alternative order the parties’ costs be paid from residue: [10] – [12]Having considered the evidence tendered by both parties detailing their interactions over the course of years the Court was not satisfied that the usual costs order ought to be departed from: [14]Following some argument about a suggestion that proceeds ought to be paid into a controlled monies account, the Court ordered that the proceeds ought to be paid into Court: [16] – [21]___If you made it this far please consider giving my firm Gravamen a follow on your favourite platform!www.gravamen.com.au

James (me! The person writing this!) criminally underappreciates the amazing community we have built together with this podcast.Here I have a quick personal message from me saying:- If you are thinking about your career please consider completing the Gravamen survey which you will find at surveymonkey- Thanks for being a part of this podcast journey! There is more to come...Jd'Awww.gravamen.com.au

In March 2026 James d'Apice had the opportunity to interview Michael Kirby, one of the most celebrated Australian lawyers of them all. Please join James and Michael as they discuss:1. Michael's new book edited by Dr Paul Vout KC, 'Law Justice and Other Challenges' available through Federation Press. https://federationpress.com.au/produc...2. Ethics, the billable hour, AI, and contemporary practice.3. International current events in the context of Michael's role as a champion of international law and the current "might is right" zeitgeist.4. The role of humour in legal practice.5. What advice Michael has for us.6. Heaps more!The interview was for BenchTV. A link to it can be found here: https://benchtv.com.au/preview-law-ju...

“The appointor is dead. Long live the appointor!”___G was born in 1923 and died in 2011. Before death G enjoyed business success and made a succession plan: [5]G had 4 children and a number of grandchildren: [15] – [20]The trust was settled by deed in 1986 with G appointor and settlor. P was (and remained) the trustee: [44] and [48]The property of the trust was real property of some value and some publicly traded shares: [76]G’s plan included a trust with unusual aspects, and without clear reasons: [9]The structure was odd: (i) the trust’s terms caused the range of benefs to be reduced on G’s death; (ii) G’s role as appointor had no path for a successor on G’s death; and (iii) G failed to let their family and advisers know their reasons for this approach: [7]P came to Court in 2025 seeking amendments to the trust deed pursuant to s 86A: [10]P’s proposed amendments included dealing with the appointor issues and the breadth of beneficiaries: [13], [14]The wording of the trust deed will dictate the nature of each appointor’s role: [26], [33]The role of appointor is an administrative power dictated by each trust deed: [26] – [36]No fiduciary duty attaches to the role of appointor. The Court considered contrasting authorities regarding how an appointor’s powers – to be used in good faith and for the benefs as a whole, or for the appointor’s benefit (perhaps in their capacity as benef): [41] – [43]The trust deed had no provision dealing with the death of the appointor: [51]G was the named appointor. The deed dictated various tasks the appointor could perform, and various matters referable to the appointor’s life: [60]E.g. (i) the number of benefs was reduced after G’s death; (ii) the trustee could validly distribute income to Cos whose board included G; and (iii) the trust could only be varied during G’s life: [61]The provenance of the trust deed was not clear with some suggestion the deed was a “standard precedent”: [71] – [74]In certain circs the Court can appoint an appointor pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction: [91] – [97](Respectfully) Excellent consideration was given to the statutory underpinning of the Sup Ct’s power to amend trusts: [106] – [150]After reviewing various jurisdictions’ evolving position on the point, the Court found the Sup Ct had that power to insert an appointor: [167]The Court noted it had the power to widen the pool of benefs and a discretion to approve proposed arrangements or amendments to trusts: [171], [172]The Court resolved its inherent jurisdiction would be exercised in this case to appoint the appointors contended for by P: [182]Having heard evidence that restoring the beneficiary class to its “pre-G’s death” position would be beneficial for family harmony, the Court made the amendment to that effect: [188] – [197]___Please follow James d'Apice, Gravamen, and Coffee and a Case Note on your favourite platform!www.gravamen.com.au

“I was not 2.01% oppressive!”___TeeCo had 2 directors, each a 50% shareholder and Dir; half the units were held by P (one of the directors, who held that interest as trustee) and D3 (a company related to the other director, A): [2] – [6]P’s spouse acted as P’s agent throughout: [7]P sued seeking s 233 sale orders. A cross-claimed seeking s 233 sale orders and alleging a breach of duty by P: [8], [9]The relevant property had a value of $4.74m: [10]A JV was struck between P and A to buy the property: [20] – [27]TeeCo was soon after incorporated and exchanged contracts: [29] – [31]An attempt to finance the purchase failed: [32] – [55]The sale completed with bridging finance obtained by A, and funds provided by P: [65]Discussions about finance continued. Due to A’s self-employed status and delays with tax returns, an “on-loan” arrangement was struck to deal with A’s bridging loan: [66] – [75]P got the finance and on-lent to TeeCo with a 2.01% margin, putting this to A and proceeding on that basis: [80], [81]In time, A grew dissatisfied with the margin: [87] – [90]A said they had thought the 2.01% margin was a lender-required necessity. On learning it was not, A objected: [100] – [107]P pressed for funding to pay TeeCo’s strata levies and other costs. A resisted. The Owners Corp sued: [108] – [128], [145]The parties fell into dispute, A asserting P had engaged in “profiteering” with the 2.01% margin: [130] – [144]Each party was critical of the other’s evidence: [152], [153]A alleged inter alia that P (incl by their spouse) breached their duties to TeeCo and to A by suggesting the 2.01% was a necessity: [179], [180], [184]The evidence showed the parties initially contemplated A’s side paying 4.5%. The lender lent to P at its rate (later confirmed at 2.49% - leaving the 2.01% margin for TeeCo to pay): [214] – [216]Relevantly, this arrangement was discussed with the idea of a prompt refinance being the goal of both: [221]Key issue: whether P represented to A that the lender *required* the margin that was eventually applied: [233]A was unable to convince the Court that P induced A into their misapprehension that the lender *required* a margin of 2.01%: [244]This was fatal to both A’s oppression claim and breach of duty claim: [246]This left P to progress their oppression claims against A in relation to failures to engage with payment of levies, delaying finance for the project with slowness in getting tax returns etc: [255]A’s failure to engage with P about TeeCo’s debts was oppressive: [276], [277]Some of P’s other complaints about A were not oppressive: [286], [295]Noting the deadlock, the Court resolved the relief should bring the relationship to an end: [305]A’s attempt to seek an order that they buy the property was not made in part due to A’s oppressive conduct: [333]P got their buyout orders: [344]___If you made it this far please head to www.gravamen.com.au#auslaw #coffeeandacasenote #gravamen

James had the pleasure of sitting down to chat with the legendary Jerome Doraisamy in early 2026 about James' firm Gravamen, long lunches, charity donations, and what it means for a firm when the honeymoon is over...https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/podcast/43900-the-boutique-lawyer-show-what-happens-after-your-firm-s-initial-honeymoon-period

“We need trustees for sale because you changed your house!”___P and D owned land as 50/50 TiCs. P applied to have s 66G trustees appointed to sell it: [1]D resisted, claiming this breached an oral agreement: [2]P’s claimed $1M in damages to be paid from D’s share. D XC’d around $350K: [4] – [9]P and D bought the land to build 2 dwellings of the same value for their respective families: [10] – [11], [99]They agreed on how the development would go: [8], [12]D, who controlled a building company, would cause the work to be done: [13], [14]An architect was engaged by D before commencement: [22]Following a QS estimate, D’s firm issued a quote for $985K to build based on the plans: [25]P and D faced challenges obtaining finance: [31]In May 2017 D, having opposed pulling out of the arrangement, sold their home to finance the project: [34]D changed the construction materials in D’s house, increasing costs (and, we infer, building quality). P did not agree: [35], [95]P and D entered into a new contract with D’s building company to do the same work, but for $860K…: [38]The changed price was to show serviceability to possible lenders: [39]Construction progressed but the finances were exhausted before completion. P suspected D spent the money on other projects D’s company was working on: [43]In 2019, further money was borrowed: [44], [45]Later in 2021 further finance was obtained, and an OC issued: [47], [48]The land was subdivided: [50]Negotiations for apportioning costs failed: [49], [52]P commenced these proceedings and brought defect proceedings: [53]The Court reviewed the principles relating to the making of s 66G orders: [54] – [58]A s 66G order might not be made where a contract stands in the way. 4 questions arise, including whether there’s an agreed “exit strategy”: [57], [58]D said there was an agreement for one subdivided property to pass to each of P and D on completion, with an accounting for costs to follow – this exit strategy, D said, prevented a s 66G order: [65], [66]No term explicitly prohibited appointment of s 66G trustees: [92]The Court found the “exit strategy” D contended for would only apply if construction proceeded pursuant to the plans. As D amended their home (with the use of different construction materials) construction did not proceed pursuant to the plans, and so the exit strategy failed: [93], [94], [95]Regarding onus: it was not for P to prove entitlement to a s 66G, but for D to disprove. D failed: [98] – [100]After dealing with issues flowing from P putting forward 1 (and not the required 2) trustees, and for seeking unusually generous compensation, the orders were made: [106], [107]D failed to establish entitlement to any additional funds: [109]Trustees were appointed, with an account to follow, with costs to be paid from the corpus. D’s XC was dismissed with costs: [135], [136]___Please follow James d'Apice, Coffee and a Case Note, and Gravamen on your favourite platform!www.gravamen.com.au

“I removed your trustee, but you shouldn’t have removed me!”__A corporate group focussed on car sales and property holding.The Ps complained a Tee was wrongly removed by the Ds. One the Ds, the group’s CEO, was then removed as CEO and director of various Cos by the Ps: [14]The Ps brought a claim re the Tee removal. The Ds brought a cross-claim about the removal of the CEO D: [15], [16]The natural person parties were relatives: [28]In 2017, the CEO D purported to become the relevant trust’s appointor: [29] – [33]In 2019, the CEO D attempted to sell their stake in the enterprise for $42m. On the offer’s rejection, relationships deteriorated: [34] – [36]In 2021 and 2022, various offers were rejected, and proceedings commenced: [37] – [51]In 2024, CEO D unsuccessfully attempted to remove their aunts, Ps, as directors: [55] – [60]CEO D as appointor removed the trustee P and appointed a related entity of the Ds: [61] – [72]The CEO D was then removed as CEO and director by their aunts: [73] – [82]Each witness faced credibility challenges. Evidence showed the CEO D had falsified docs: [83] – [100], [182]CEO D’s placement as appointor followed an audit of the group showing some roles were held by the dead: [132] – [138]There were inconsistent written records of the purported 1 May 2017 meeting placing CEO D as appointor. Some records suggested proper steps to place CEO D as appointor were not taken: [146] – [267]The Court concluded the relevant P was not in attendance at the relevant meeting, making the meeting inquorate, and meaning CEO D’s placement as appointor was not properly made: [268]The Ds’ application for s 1322 relief (curing what the Ds characterised as a procedural irregularity) was unsuccessful: [283]The Ps therefore succeeded: the purported appointment of the Ds’ replacement Tee was invalid as CEO D was not appointor: [399] – [404]The Court then considered CEO D’s termination as an employee: [407] – [409]The Ds suggested CEO D’s removal by the Ps was improperly motivated; a ruse to cause a share sale: [461] – [476]CEO D “shut out” the Ps from management [479], wrote to car makers (who provided the group with its stock for sale) criticising the Ps [483] – [496] and spoke of the Ps in contemptuous, belittling ways over time [497] – [500]The Court found CEO D properly terminated as the relevant Ps had lost trust and confidence in them: [503]Nor was the termination found to be a breach of contract: [508]The Ds alleged CEO D’s termination and removal as director was oppressive for s 232 reasons: [567]CEO D’s employment termination was not improper, and so not oppressive. Similarly: nor was their removal as director: [589], [606]The oppression claim failed: [637]The Ps’ claim succeeded, and the Ds cross-claim failed. Costs followed the event: [648], [649]___Please follow James d'Apice, Coffee and a Case Note, and Gravamen on your favourite platform.#auslaw #coffeeandacasenote #corporatelawyer #gravamenwww.gravamen.com.au