Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU - Teil 02/03
Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU - Teil 02/03
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Die Universitätsbibliothek (UB) verfügt über ein umfangreiches Archiv an elektronischen Medien, das von Volltextsammlungen über Zeitungsarchive, Wörterbücher und Enzyklopädien bis hin zu ausführlichen Bibliographien und mehr als 1000 Datenbanken reicht. Auf iTunes U stellt die UB unter anderem eine Auswahl an elektronischen Publikationen der Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler an der LMU bereit. (Dies ist der 2. von 3 Teilen der Sammlung 'Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU'.)
Standards and Incentives under Moral Hazard with Limited Liability
We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-dimensional. One dimension of the agent’s effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only on outcome but also on observable effort. The principal’s optimal contract gives the agent no rent and – in contrast to the first-best allocation – uses toomuch observable effort and too little unobservable effort. This distortion in the relative use of the two kinds of effort increases if the agent’s liability becomes more limited.
Feb 1, 2012
Price Discrimination and Fairness Concerns
We analyze the profitability of third degree price discrimination under consideration of consumers' fairness concerns within an experiment and explain the results within a theoretical framework. We find that with an increase in the price differential negative reciprocal reactions by disadvantaged consumers become stronger compared to positive reciprocal reactions by advantaged consumers. Consequently, the profit maximizing price differential lies below the one predicted to be optimal by standard theory. Further, profitability increases when consumers who are regarded as poorer are charged lower prices compared to when the wealth of the different consumer groups is unknown.
Feb 1, 2012
Economic Analysis of Pay-for-delay Settlements
and Their Legal Ruling
In this paper, we ask whether courts should continue to rule settlements in the context of pharmaceutical claims per se legal, when these settlements comprise payments from originator to generic companies, potentially delaying generic entry compared to the underlying litigation. Within a theoretical framework we compare consumer welfare under the rule of per se legality with that under alternative standards. We find that the rule of per se legality induces maximal collusion among settling companies. In comparison, the rule of per se illegality entirely prevents collusion and the rule of reason induces limited collusion when antitrust enforcement is subject to error. Contrary to intuition, limited collusion can be welfare enhancing as it increases companies' expected settlement profits and thus fosters generic entry. Generic companies obtain additional incentives to challenge probabilistic patents, which potentially leads to overall increased competition. We further show that generic entry is fostered more effectively by inducing limited collusion than by rewarding first generic entrants with an exclusivity right.
Feb 1, 2012
Risk attitudes and Medicare Part D enrollment decisions
The new Medicare Part D program provides prescription drug coverage for older Americans through highly subsidized and tightly regulated plans offered by private insurance firms. For most eligible individuals without coverage from other sources, obtaining Part D coverage would be rational, but it requires active enrollment and plan choice decisions. We investigate if non-enrollment in Medicare Part D can partly be explained by risk aversion. Data are taken from a national online survey conducted just after the introduction Part D. The survey included a context-free and a context-related hypothetical lottery to measure an individual’s attitude towards risk. Respondents who are risk tolerant according to these measures were significantly less likely to enroll in Part D. We also illustrate that hypothetical choice questions designed to elicit risk attitudes are subject to reference-point effects. Even minor differences in the priming of respondents can result in potentially misleading conclusions about the role of risk aversion in the insurance decisions.
Feb 1, 2012
Can Naked Exclusion Be Procompetitive?
Antitrust scholars have argued that exclusive contracts have anticompetitive, or at best neutral effects, if no efficiencies are generated. In contrast, this paper shows that exclusive contracts can have procompetitive effects, provided buyers are imperfect downstream competitors and contract breach is feasible. In that case an efficient entrant is not necessarily foreclosed through exclusive contracting but induces buyers to breach. Because breaching buyers have to pay expectation damages to the incumbent, the downstream profits they obtain when breaching must be large enough. Therefore, the entrant needs to set a lower wholesale price than absent exclusive contracting, leading to lower final consumer prices and higher welfare.
Feb 1, 2012
Using the internet to administer more realistic vignette experiments
This article illustrates an innovative method of administering stated choice studies (or vignette experiments) using computers and the Internet. The use of video clips to deliver information to research participants makes vignettes more realistic, helps to engage interest of research participants, and can reduce framing effects. The method also provides research participants with interactive options before making judgments. A study to determine the views of older people regarding residential options is used to illustrate the method. Even older people with limited experience in using computers participated successfully. The study findings showed that research participants responded both to the audiovisual characteristics of vignette persons and to the variables in the vignette structure.
Jan 1, 2012
Fighting Multiple Tax Havens
This paper develops a competition theory framework that evaluates an important aspect of the OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices Initiative against tax havens. We show that the sequential nature of the process is harmful and more costly than a “big bang” multilateral agreement. The sequentiality may even prevent the process from being completed successfully. Closing down a subset of tax havens reduces competition among the havens that remain active. This makes their “tax haven business” more profitable and shifts a larger share of rents to these remaining tax havens, making them more reluctant to give up their “tax haven business”. Moreover, the outcome of this process, reducing the number of tax havens, but not eliminating them altogether, may reduce welfare in the OECD.
Jan 1, 2012
A Three-Decade “Kuhnian” History of the Antebellum Puzzle:
Explaining the shrinking of the US population at the onset of modern economic growth
In 1979, when anthropometric history was still in its infancy, Robert Fogel and collaborators reported that the height of the US male white population began to decline quite unexpectedly around the birth cohorts of 1830. This was quite a conundrum on account of the fact that according to conventional economic theory nutritional status was not expected to diminish at the outset of modern economic growth, i.e., at a time when incomes were growing robustly. Although many hypotheses were offered, not until 1987 was the comprehensive solution to the puzzle offered that the height decline was due primarily to a decline in food consumption: agricultural productivity did not keep pace with rapid population growth and urbanization. However, it took a third of a century for a Kuhnian paradigm shift to occur until most of the participants in the debate accepted the model elucidated by Komlos in 1987.
Jan 1, 2012
Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict
We study conflict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer`s (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and find that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.
Jan 1, 2012
A Case Where Barro Expectations Are Not Rational
This note generalizes Feldstein’s (1976) criticism of Barro’s(1974) analysis for the case that the interest rate exceeds the growth rate. This is done by considering an economy in steady state where all agents hold “Barro expectations”: they believe that government debt must necessarily be repaid and therefore leave the present value of their income streams unchanged. In this scenario, a change in the mode of taxation affects the present value of disposable income in the private sector. This violates their Barro expectations.
Jan 1, 2012
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