1 for 8 Billion Campaign is a Misnomer *Who bankrolls the 1 for 8 Billion Campaign?UNA-UK is a steering committee member and co-founder of the earlier 1 for 7 Billion campaign, and part of the campaign’s institutional support structure. Publicly visible support/funding includes Robert Bosch Stiftung for this report and Open Society Foundations seed funding for campaign support. The Problem With “1 for 8 Billion”: The UN Secretary-General Is Not a Global PresidentA new report by the 1 for 8 Billion campaign, Backroom Deals: The Trade in Promises for Support Between Member States and Candidates for UN Secretary-General, raises a legitimate issue: the opacity of the UN Secretary-General selection process and the long-standing practice of powerful states seeking influence over senior UN appointments. The report is right to scrutinise “ringfencing” — the informal reservation of top UN posts for nationals of particular powerful countries — and it is right to argue that the next Secretary-General should have greater latitude to appoint a senior team on merit, geography, gender balance and competence.But the campaign’s own name exposes a deeper conceptual flaw in how parts of civil society discuss the office. “1 for 8 Billion” may work as a slogan. As constitutional analysis, it is wrong.The UN Secretary-General is not elected by the world’s population. The office-holder is not a global president, not a popular sovereign, and not a democratic delegate of eight billion people. Under the UN Charter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council and serves as the chief administrative officer of the Organization. The role is politically important, but it is not executive authority over humanity. It is an international civil-service office embedded in an intergovernmental system. This distinction is important. The Secretary-General does not govern the world. The Secretary-General works through mandates approved by Member States, budgets approved by Member States, agencies and departments staffed by international officials, and political access granted — or denied — by governments. Even the moral authority of the office depends on a difficult equilibrium: independence from individual governments, but confidence from the membership collectively.The 1 for 8 Billion report itself implicitly acknowledges this. It notes that Secretaries-General work “in partnership with states, according to rules and systems established by states.” That sentence undercuts the campaign’s branding. If the office depends on partnership with states, then the idea of “one” person “for” eight billion people overstates the office and risks importing a presidential campaign logic into an institution that was deliberately designed not to be a world government.There is a valid argument that the Secretary-General must be independent. Article 100 of the Charter states that the Secretary-General and staff should not seek or receive instructions from governments or outside authorities, and that Member States should not seek to influence them in discharging their responsibilities. But independence is not the same as personal rule. It is institutional independence within a Charter-based system, not charismatic authority above it. That is where the report’s critique of backroom deals is strongest — and also where it needs more discipline. The report draws on histories, memoirs and more than 40 interviews, many with former diplomats and senior UN officials. It compiles alleged or reported examples of candidates being pressured to appoint nationals from powerful countries to senior posts. It points to recurring patterns involving the P5 and to long-standing monopolies over key UN jobs. These are serious issues. They deserve attention.Yet the report also relies heavily on politically sensitive, partly anonymous testimony, and it acknowledges that many of the practices it describes are difficult to document. That does not make the claims false. It does mean they should be treated with evidentiary care. Alleged bargains, plausible patterns, historical rumours and documented quid pro quos should not all be collapsed into one category. A report about opacity should be especially precise about its own evidentiary thresholds.The campaign also raises a transparency problem of its own. 1 for 8 Billion asks candidates to disclose campaign financing, endorsements, conflicts of interest and commitments. That is a reasonable standard. But NGOs making these demands should meet a comparable standard of disclosure. The report is marked as supported by the Robert Bosch Stiftung. The campaign’s own public materials show that Open Society Foundations provided seed funding for support to the campaign, and that UNA-UK has played a significant institutional role, including as a steering committee member and co-founder of the previous 1 for 7 Billion initiative. None of this is improper in itself. Civil society campaigns need money, staff, networks and institutional homes. But it should be stated plainly. When a campaign positions itself as the public-interest watchdog of the UN Secretary-General selection process, its funders, host arrangements, steering committee roles and advocacy objectives should be easy to identify. If candidates are expected to disclose their backers, so should campaigners.The role of UNA-UK is particularly relevant. UNA-UK says it sits on the campaign’s steering committee alongside CIVICUS, GQUAL, Plataforma CIPÓ, Southern Voice and WomanSG, and that these groups “drive advocacy efforts” with Member States, NGO supporters and individuals. The campaign’s governance document gives the steering committee responsibility for strategy, policy, communications, outreach and fundraising. UNA-UK also appears in campaign materials as a safeguarding and complaints contact. This is not a neutral observer role. It is an advocacy role. That does not discredit the campaign. But it should temper the language of moral authority. A civil society coalition, however well-intentioned, does not stand in for “we the peoples” in any formal constitutional sense. Nor does it substitute for the political legitimacy of the 193 Member States that constitute the United Nations. Civil society has a necessary role in scrutiny and public debate. It should not imply that it speaks directly for eight billion people.A better name for the campaign would reflect the reality of the institution: “193 for the Charter,” “Member States for an Independent Secretariat,” or “For a Transparent Secretary-General Selection.” Such names would be less catchy, but more accurate. The current name suggests that the Secretary-General is a singular tribune of humanity. In practice, the Secretary-General is a senior international official, leading a Secretariat, working with a Deputy Secretary-General, Under-Secretaries-General, agencies, country teams, envoys, resident coordinators and — above all — Member States.This is not a semantic quibble. Language shapes expectations. When campaigners describe the Secretary-General as “one for eight billion,” they encourage the public to imagine a figure who can independently solve wars, climate breakdown, humanitarian crises and institutional dysfunction. That makes for good advocacy, but poor institutional literacy. It also risks personalising a much deeper structural problem: the imbalance of power between Member States, especially the P5, and the wider UN membership.The report is right that opaque bargaining over senior UN jobs damages legitimacy. It is right that national monopolies over top posts should be challenged. It is right that candidates should be asked whether they will resist inappropriate pressure. It is right that journalists should pay attention to capital visits, straw-poll shifts, senior appointment promises and post-election negotiations.But the remedy is not to pretend the Secretary-General derives authority from eight billion people. The remedy is to strengthen the Charter-based process: clearer criteria, open hearings, serious General Assembly scrutiny, transparent nominations, an end to informal monopolies over senior posts, and fuller disclosure by both candidates and the civil society campaigns seeking to shape the race.The next Secretary-General will not be “one for eight billion.” She or he will be one Secretary-General, appointed through Member States, constrained by the Charter, dependent on a senior team, and accountable to the Organization as a whole. The UN Charter establishes the Secretary-General as appointed by the General Assembly on Security Council recommendation, chief administrative officer, and bound by Articles 97–101 on Secretariat functions and independence. That is precisely why the process matters — and why criticism of backroom deals should be anchored in institutional reality, not campaign branding.Note: 1 for 8 Billion’s steering committee includes CIVICUS, Plataforma CIPÓ/CIPÓ Inc, Southern Voice, UNA-UK, WomanSG and GQUAL. Who funds these NGOs?Become a paid subscriber.*A misnomer is an incorrect, unsuitable, or misleading name or term applied to a person, object, or concept. It occurs when something is named inappropriately based on its true nature or function. Everyday ExamplesMisnomers are surprisingly common in everyday language and science. Often, they arise because something was named before its exact nature was understood, or because of colloquial habits.* Koala bear: Often called koala “bears,” they are actually marsupials, not bears.* Dry cleaning: Because clothes are soaked in liquid chemical solvents rather than washed dry, it is a misnomer.* Jellyfish: They are aquatic invertebrates, not fish.* French fries: The popular deep-fried potatoes actually originated in Belgium, not France.* Funny bone: It isn’t a bone at all, but rather the ulnar nerve running near your humerus bone. Common ConfusionsA misnomer is strictly an incorrect name. It is often incorrectly used as a fancy word for a general mistake, faulty statement, or conceptual misconception. EtymologyThe word comes from 15th-century Middle English and Anglo-French mesnoumer. It breaks down into mes- (wrongly) and nomer (to name). In Case You Missed UN Human Rights CouncilUN Report urges countries to provide paid maternity leave, the enforcement of child-support obligations, and protection of mothers’ rights in child-custody proceedingsA United Nations expert has called on governments to treat violence against mothers as a distinct and urgent human rights issue, warning that mothers remain largely invisible in law, policy and official data despite facing specific forms of economic, reproductive, physical and psychological harm.Presenting a new report to the Human Rights Council, Reem Alsalem, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls, said motherhood is still widely treated as a private family matter rather than as a social and economic contribution requiring public protection.That invisibility, she argued, leaves mothers exposed to forms of violence and discrimination that are often absorbed into broader categories of gender-based violence, poverty or family conflict, rather than addressed directly.The report, titled Violence against mothers, identifies a wide spectrum of harms: the “motherhood penalty” in employment and wages; obstetric and reproductive violence; domestic, physical and sexual abuse; coercive control; psychological trauma; and violations in conflict settings.Mothers should be recognized as a distinct category of rights-holders.That would require states to collect data disaggregated by motherhood status, use mother-specific language in laws and policies, and design targeted protections rather than assuming that general protections for women, families or children are sufficient.Economic ImpactLabour-market research has long documented what economists often call the “child penalty”: the sharp and persistent divergence between women’s and men’s employment and earnings after the birth of a first child.A major cross-country study published in The Review of Economic Studies found clear child penalties in most countries examined, based on microdata from 134 countries representing more than 95 percent of the world’s population.The finding helps explain why motherhood remains a major driver of gender inequality even in economies where women’s education and labour-force participation have improved.A 2024 scoping review in Behavioral Sciences reached a similar conclusion from the workplace side: motherhood continues to affect women’s career progression through discrimination, reduced promotion opportunities, workplace inflexibility, unequal care expectations and inadequate policy support.Alsalem’s report also stresses that violence against mothers affects children, creating intergenerational harms. Exposure to violence in the home has been associated with behavioural, emotional and developmental consequences for children, while violence against a mother can disrupt the caregiving environment on which children depend.Alsalem urged states to move beyond symbolic recognition.Her recommendations include paid maternity leave, enforcement of child-support obligations from pregnancy onwards, free and accessible maternal healthcare, protection of mothers’ rights in child-custody proceedings, and accountability for violations committed in conflict settings.The report is likely to generate debate because it asks states to name mothers explicitly as rights-holders at a time when many legal systems prefer broader gender-neutral or family-based terminology.But the Special Rapporteur’s argument is that neutrality can conceal harm.If motherhood is not measured, it is difficult to protect. If mothers are not named, the violence they face can remain legally and politically invisible.For the Human Rights Council, the report places a long-standing private burden into a public framework: the safety of mothers is not only a family issue, a health issue or a labour-market issue. It is a human rights issue with consequences across generations.The report is A/HRC/62/49, Violence against mothers, for the Human Rights Council’s 62nd session. The labour-market evidence comes from Kleven, Landais and Leite-Mariante’s Child Penalty Atlas, which uses microdata from 134 countries and finds that men and women follow similar employment trends before parenthood but diverge sharply and persistently after a first child in most countries.UN CharterUN History in San FranciscoUN Charter was adopted and signed on the 26 June, 1945The ceremony took place at the Veterans War Memorial Building, at the close of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, on June 26, 1945.The Charter had been adopted unanimously the previous day, after weeks of negotiations shaped by the devastation of the Second World War and the determination to build a new system for peace, security, human rights and international law.The countries that signed in San Francisco included Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippine Commonwealth, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, the Union of South Africa and Yugoslavia.Poland, absent from the San Francisco Conference, signed later and became one of the 51 original Members of the United Nations.Among the officials present were figures such as Edward R. Stettinius Jr., US Secretary of State and chair of the US delegation; T. V. Soong, China’s Foreign Minister and chair of the Chinese delegation; the Earl of Halifax, the United Kingdom’s Ambassador to the United States; Alexander Loudon, the Netherlands’ Ambassador to the United States; Miguel Ángel Cárcano, Argentina’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Julian R. Cáceres, Honduras’ Ambassador to the United States; and Clarence L. Simpson, Vice-President of Liberia and chair of the Liberian delegation.Among the 160 signatories of the Charter, only four were women: Bertha Lutz of Brazil, Minerva Bernardino of the Dominican Republic, Virginia Gildersleeve of the United States, and Wu Yi-fang of China.Lutz and Bernardino were central to securing the Charter’s explicit reference to “the equal rights of men and women,” language that helped place gender equality inside the founding text of the United Nations.The Charter itself was negotiated collectively by the delegations in San Francisco, building on earlier wartime proposals.Its Preamble is closely associated with Jan Christiaan Smuts of South Africa, who helped shape the language that still defines the UN’s founding purpose: peace, human rights, dignity, equality and social progress.The Charter’s opening words remain among the most consequential in modern diplomacy: “We the peoples of the United Nations…”Nearly eight decades later, the Charter remains both a legal foundation and a political test.Its purpose was not simply to create an institution.It was to prevent another world war, uphold sovereign equality, reaffirm fundamental human rights, and commit states to collective responsibility.The question today is not whether the Charter still matters.It is whether Member States are prepared to act as if it does.#UnitedNations #UNCharter #SanFranciscoConference #Multilateralism #InternationalLaw #HumanRights #PeaceAndSecurity #TheBrief This is a public episode. 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How is the UN Secretary-General selected?The UN Secretary-General is not directly elected by the public or freely chosen by the General Assembly. Under Article 97 of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. In practice, the Security Council decides first, and the General Assembly normally appoints the candidate recommended to it.The decisive political filter is therefore the Security Council. A candidate needs sufficient support among the 15 Council members and must avoid a veto by any of the five permanent members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Substantive Council decisions require nine affirmative votes and no veto by a permanent member.Since the reforms around the 2016 selection process, the procedure has become more transparent, but not fully democratic. Member States may nominate candidates; candidates submit CVs and vision statements; the General Assembly holds informal dialogues; and civil society and Member States can ask questions. However, the decisive bargaining and straw polls still take place behind closed doors in the Security Council.Resolution 69/321 was important because it created the expectation of informal dialogues and a more transparent nomination process. Still, the General Assembly has almost always received only one candidate from the Council. Legally, the Assembly appoints; politically, it rarely challenges the Council’s recommendation.The race is therefore less an election than a diplomatic elimination process. The successful candidate must be acceptable to Washington, Moscow, Beijing, London and Paris, while also gathering support from elected Council members and satisfying regional and political expectations.Dag Hammarskjöld is the classic example of a compromise candidate. In 1953, after Trygve Lie’s resignation, better-known figures such as Lester B. Pearson of Canada, Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, Nasrollah Entezam of Iran and Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico were considered. Pearson was blocked by the Soviet Union. Hammarskjöld, then a Swedish economist, civil servant and diplomat, emerged as a low-profile figure acceptable to both Cold War blocs. He was recommended by the Security Council and appointed by the General Assembly, serving from April 1953 until his death in 1961.Kofi Annan’s selection in 1996 followed a different path. Boutros Boutros-Ghali sought a second term, but the United States vetoed his reappointment. The Council then turned to African alternatives. Annan, from Ghana, was then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and a long-serving UN insider. He became the compromise candidate, was recommended by the Security Council on 13 December 1996, and was appointed by the General Assembly for a term beginning on 1 January 1997.Other races show the same pattern. In 1961, U Thant of Burma was chosen as an interim compromise after Hammarskjöld’s death. In 1971, Kurt Waldheim emerged after vetoes and miscalculations among the permanent members. In 1981, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was selected after a long deadlock in which China blocked Waldheim’s attempt at a third term and the United States opposed Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania. That race helped consolidate the norm of two five-year terms and reinforced the practice of regional rotation.Several past Secretaries-General were career diplomats, including Kurt Waldheim of Austria, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar of Peru and Ban Ki-moon of South Korea. Pérez de Cuéllar was a lawyer and career diplomat who joined Peru’s foreign ministry. Ban had a 37-year diplomatic career before becoming South Korea’s foreign minister. Waldheim was an Austrian diplomat and later foreign minister.Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant were diplomatic figures, but not career diplomats in the same strict sense. Hammarskjöld came from Sweden’s senior civil service and foreign-policy establishment. U Thant had been an educator, civil servant and Burma’s Permanent Representative to the UN.Kofi Annan was not a national career diplomat. He was the first Secretary-General chosen from the ranks of UN staff, making him a career international civil servant rather than a foreign-ministry diplomat.Trygve Lie was primarily a Norwegian lawyer, Labour politician and foreign minister. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was an international-law scholar and Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs. António Guterres was primarily a politician, former Portuguese prime minister and later UN High Commissioner for Refugees.For the current succession, the same architecture applies. The next Secretary-General is due to take office on 1 January 2027. The process formally began in November 2025, with Member States invited to nominate candidates and renewed pressure for gender equality, as no woman has ever held the post. However there is a greater number of women in leadership positions at the UN in the last five years. WMO, ITU, IOM, UNAIDS, UN Women, WTO, UNCTAD, to name a few, are all UN System agencies led by a woman. Is a woman necessarily better? Of course not. It all depends on her background and her track record supporting the careers of other women at the UN and elsewhere.What are the current candidates’ background?Rafael Mariano Grossi (Argentina)Rafael Mariano Grossi is widely viewed as one of the strongest contenders in the 2026 UN Secretary-General race. A career diplomat, he has served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency since 2019 and previously represented Argentina as ambassador to Austria and to the international organizations in Vienna.Grossi is considered a frontrunner largely because of his extensive engagement with Security Council powers and his high-profile diplomacy on Iran, Ukraine and nuclear security. Among diplomats, he is generally regarded as highly capable, energetic and politically skilled. He has significantly raised the profile of the IAEA through constant shuttle diplomacy, direct engagement with world leaders and efforts to increase women’s representation within the agency. Even critics usually acknowledge his effectiveness as a negotiator and crisis manager.His reputation is especially strong among many Western countries, states that prioritize nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, governments looking for a more managerial and operational UN leader, and diplomats who believe the next Secretary-General must be comfortable operating in major geopolitical crises.Although Security Council voting remains confidential, analysts generally see Grossi as potentially attractive to several of the Permanent Five members. Through the IAEA, he has worked extensively with Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Paris and London. He is viewed as a pragmatic technocrat rather than an ideological figure, and he has experience managing one of the UN system’s most politically sensitive agencies. He may also draw support from parts of Latin America, European governments familiar with his Vienna-based work, and states seeking a strong administrator.Grossi’s main strengths are crisis diplomacy, institutional management, reform messaging and familiarity with the P5. His frequent missions to Ukraine during the war, his negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme and his direct dealings with major powers have given him unusually visible experience in high-stakes diplomacy. He also leads a large international organization with a technical mandate and global field operations, which strengthens his claim to managerial competence.His reform message may also appeal to governments concerned about the UN’s financial and institutional pressures. Grossi has advocated a leaner and more focused UN, with less duplication and greater efficiency at a time when the system is facing severe budgetary strain.Perhaps more than any other candidate, Grossi already works routinely with all five permanent members of the Security Council. If the Council prioritizes managerial competence, crisis diplomacy, relations with major powers and institutional reform, he is arguably among the strongest candidates.At present, many diplomats in New York and Geneva continue to regard Grossi as one of the most viable contenders from a Security Council electability perspective. His candidacy combines UN system experience, geopolitical credibility, technical-management expertise and familiarity with the P5 — all central factors in a race that is ultimately decided less by public campaigning than by private diplomatic acceptability.María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés (Ecuador)The domestic controversy surrounding María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés stems primarily from her high-profile roles under the deeply polarizing leftist administration of former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa. While international bodies viewed her as an accomplished diplomat, politicians in Ecuador saw her as a fierce political opponent.The Correa Legacy: Espinosa served as Foreign Minister (twice) and Defense Minister under Rafael Correa. Correa’s administration was marked by a dramatic shift toward authoritarian socialism, crackdowns on local media, and major corruption scandals. Because she was a core member of his cabinet, the Ecuadorian right wing and centrist opposition heavily associate her with his controversial legacy. The Julian Assange Case: As Foreign Minister in 2017 and 2018, Espinosa was tasked with handling Julian Assange, who was taking refuge in Ecuador’s London embassy. She attempted to grant Assange Ecuadorian citizenship and official diplomatic status to smuggle him out of the UK. The plan backfired, drawing immense anger from domestic lawmakers who accused her of mismanaging national security and international relations.The Impeachment Attempt: In 2018, shortly before she left for her UNGA presidency, opposition lawmakers in Ecuador’s National Assembly launched an official impeachment process against her. They accused her of abandoning her duties to campaign for the UN spot and failing to protect Ecuadorian journalists kidnapped and killed on the Colombian border. Though the impeachment ultimately failed to gain enough votes, it deeply fractured her domestic reputation.Stance on Regional Dictatorships: Ecuadorian conservatives heavily criticized Espinosa’s soft diplomatic stance toward the socialist regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua. Opponents argued that her foreign policy compromised Ecuador’s democratic values to protect regional leftist allies.This domestic divide remains highly active. When she was nominated for UN Secretary-General in May 2026, she was backed by the Caribbean nation of Antigua and Barbuda, rather than her own country. Ecuador’s current conservative government, led by Daniel Noboa, has largely distanced itself from her campaign due to these lasting political scars. Rebeca Grynspan (Costa Rica)Rebeca Grynspan is generally regarded in Geneva as one of the least polarizing candidate in the current UN Secretary-General race. Unlike Michelle Bachelet, Maria Fernanda Espinosa, or Macky Sall, she does not carry major geopolitical baggage, and that is her weakness.Many diplomats credit her negotiating efforts during a difficult period marked by debt crises, supply-chain disruptions, and the war in Ukraine. How she is viewed by different groups:* Human rights NGOs: less enthusiastic because her profile is economic rather than rights-based.* Security and geopolitical circles: sometimes viewed as lacking crisis-management experience compared with Grossi.Regarding support for her candidacy, only Costa Rica has formally nominated her. The actual voting inside the Security Council remains highly opaque.That said, diplomatic reporting and conversations around the race suggest several sources of potential support:* Costa Rica is actively campaigning on her behalf.* Much of Central America views her favorably.* She has extensive networks throughout Latin America from her years leading the Ibero-American General Secretariat.* Spain has historically been supportive of her career and backed her appointment to UNCTAD.As for controversies, there are relatively few by UN standards:UNCTAD’s ideological directionSome diplomats and analysts criticized her 2021 appointment because they feared UNCTAD would become less independent and less willing to challenge mainstream economic orthodoxy. Critics worried that her background in UNDP and development institutions would make UNCTAD less outspoken. However, this debate remained largely confined to policy circles.Gaza and Middle East politicsA small number of commentators have speculated that her Jewish family background and Costa Rica’s historical relations with Israel could make parts of the Arab world cautious. There is little evidence, however, that this has translated into organized opposition.Lack of major-power experienceThis is probably the criticism heard most often in diplomatic circles. She has never led a G20 country, managed a major security crisis, or headed an organization with the political visibility of the IAEA, or a national government. Critics question whether she has enough geopolitical weight for a world facing wars in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan and elsewhere.Michele Bachelet (Chile)Michelle Bachelet’s tenure as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2018–2022) is generally viewed as mixed. Among diplomats from the Global South, many UN officials, and governments that favor dialogue and engagement over public confrontation, she was often respected. She brought significant political stature to the role as a former President of Chile, a physician, and a survivor of torture under the Pinochet dictatorship. Many governments saw her as pragmatic, careful, and effective at maintaining access to difficult countries.Among international human rights NGOs and many Western activists, her reputation was more controversial. Within Geneva diplomatic circles, the common assessment was that she was less confrontational than her predecessor, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein. Zeid was known for publicly naming and shaming powerful states, including major powers. Bachelet favored quiet diplomacy, engagement, and negotiation. Supporters viewed that as realistic; critics viewed it as insufficiently forceful.For the 2026 UN Secretary-General race, her human rights background remains both an asset and a liability. Supporters cite her experience leading both a country and a major UN office. Become a paid subscriber.Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett (Guyana)The new Guyana candidate is Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, Guyana’s Permanent Representative to the UN, former Foreign Minister, former Minister of Amerindian/Indigenous Affairs, and former FAO Geneva official. Guyana formally put her forward in mid-June 2026; she appeared before the UNGA informal dialogue on 18 June 2026.She is generally seen as credible, disciplined, and well-regarded among small states, especially CARICOM and parts of the Global South. Her strongest pitch is that she is a woman from a small developing state, with Security Council experience from Guyana’s 2024–25 term, and a background in food security, development, Indigenous affairs, and diplomacy. Her support is formally Guyana. Likely diplomatic sympathy could come from CARICOM/small island and small-state blocs, but there is no public evidence yet of formal endorsements beyond Guyana. Without a visible regional coalition and at least tacit P5 acceptability, she remains a long-shot candidate.She is non-threatening to major powers, experienced inside the UN, from the Caribbean/Latin American space, and can argue both gender and geographic diversity. Main weaknesses: she lacks the global name recognition of Bachelet, Grynspan, Grossi, or Macky Sall; Guyana is small; and her candidacy may split the Latin America/Caribbean female vote.Controversies: The sensitive area is Guyana’s geopolitical context, especially the Venezuela–Essequibo dispute and Guyana’s oil boom, which could make some states view her through a regional-security and energy lens rather than as a neutral UN reform candidate. Macky Sall (Senegal)Macky Sall brings executive experience but his candidacy is weakened by three major liabilities: the lack of formal African Union endorsement, Senegal’s own post-2024 political backlash against his record, and unresolved controversies over democratic backsliding, protest repression, and hidden public debt.He served as President of Senegal from 2012 to 2024, after holding senior domestic roles including Prime Minister and President of the National Assembly. He also chaired ECOWAS in 2015–2016 and the African Union from February 2022 to February 2023.His first structural problem is regional politics. There is a strong informal expectation that the next Secretary-General may come from Latin America and the Caribbean.His second and more serious problem is African backing. Sall was nominated by Burundi, not by Senegal. That is unusual: states normally nominate their own nationals, even if there is no legal rule requiring it. Opinio Juris notes that Burundi submitted Sall’s nomination on 2 March 2026 and that the nomination appeared to imply an African Union endorsement, but the AU did not formally endorse him.This is a major diplomatic vulnerability. PassBlue reported that at least 20 African countries opposed his candidacy or the procedure used to advance it, citing either procedural objections or the limited time given to member states to react. Opinio Juris further reports that 21 AU member states broke silence on the proposed AU endorsement, including Senegal itself.That means Sall cannot credibly present himself as “Africa’s candidate” in the way Boutros Boutros-Ghali or Kofi Annan could claim broad continental legitimacy. He is an African candidate, formally nominated by Burundi, but not an AU-endorsed consensus candidate.Domestic track recordSall’s domestic record is mixed. On the positive side, his presidency was associated with major infrastructure investment and the Plan Sénégal Émergent, a long-term development strategy aimed at moving Senegal toward middle-income status. Sall’s largest political liability is the end of his presidency. In 2023, he faced sustained criticism over the possibility that he might seek a third term. He eventually ruled that out, but the uncertainty had already contributed to political tension and protests. Human rights groups also documented serious concerns during the final years of his rule. Human Rights Watch said that in 2023 Senegal saw arbitrary arrests of opposition figures and activists, excessive use of force by security forces, unjustified restrictions on civic space and other violations. HRW also reported a pre-election crackdown on opposition, media and civil society in January 2024.Formally, Sall’s support is limited and ambiguous. His official nomination came from Burundi. He does not have AU endorsement. There are reports of interest from powerful states. Le Monde reported that people in Sall’s entourage claimed he had strong support from parts of the Security Council, notably France and Russia, but this should be treated cautiously because it is attributed to his circle rather than to formal government endorsements.His possible appeal to France is understandable: he is Francophone, experienced, close to Paris, and presents himself as a reformist African statesman. His possible appeal to Russia or China would likely rest on his sovereignty-conscious language and non-Western development agenda. But none of this eliminates the need to survive the P5 veto politics. A single permanent member can block him.His strongest case is: former head of state, African Union chair, development-finance advocate, Security Council reform supporter, experienced interlocutor with major powers, and a candidate who can speak to the frustration of developing countries with global governance.His weakest case is: no AU endorsement, contested democratic legacy, election-delay crisis, opposition repression allegations, protest deaths, amnesty-law controversy and hidden-debt scandal.If you ask diplomats privately in Geneva today, a common assessment is:* Grossi is often seen as the strongest geopolitical operator.* Bachelet : Women’s rights agenda was weak during her tenure.* Grynspan lacks major power experience, no women’s rights agenda.* Espinosa has a smaller support base, past attached to Assange.* Macky Sall faces scrutiny over his domestic record.* Carolyn Rodrigues has no experience in major crisis.They also spoke about women’s rights and reaching out to youth during their presentations at the UN General Assembly, but none has spoken about the aging global population, that is happening not only in advanced economies but in the Global South.India, US, all of Europe, and Brazil are facing major demographic changes, and bias towards older women in the workplace have never been addressed consistently within the UN, and neither at the country-member level in relation to their related social protection issues and progressive policies to include older women in the job market. These topics have not yet been addressed by the candidates. UNECE Puts Forth Policies to Address AgingA new UNECE Policy Brief is asking governments to change not only how they respond to population ageing, but how they talk about it.The brief, Changing the Narrative on Ageing and Older Persons, argues that public language matters because it shapes policy choices. When ageing is framed mainly as decline, dependency, fiscal pressure or demographic crisis, the result can be a narrower political debate and a weaker case for investment in health, lifelong learning, age-friendly labour markets, social protection, digital inclusion and participation across the life course.UNECE’s argument is not that governments should replace difficult demographic facts with positive messaging. It is that narratives should be more accurate. Longer lives are one of the major social achievements of modern development. Older persons are not a single category of dependency. They are workers, caregivers, volunteers, consumers, voters, mentors, entrepreneurs and community actors. Many also face exclusion, poverty, violence, digital barriers, inadequate care and discrimination. A credible ageing policy has to hold both realities at the same time.This is why the brief matters beyond communications. It connects language to policy design. If older persons are described only as a burden, governments are more likely to treat ageing as a cost-containment problem. If older persons are recognised as rights-holders and contributors, the policy menu expands to include prevention, participation, flexible working lives, intergenerational solidarity and support for people across the life course.UN System Agencies and How They Address AgeingThe UNECE work sits within a wider UN policy architecture on ageing and ageism. WHO leads the UN Decade of Healthy Ageing and the Global Campaign to Combat Ageism, defining ageism as stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination based on age. UN DESA anchors the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing and convenes the UN Inter-Agency Group on Ageing. OHCHR addresses the rights of older persons and age discrimination through the mandate of the Independent Expert on the enjoyment of all human rights by older persons. UNFPA works on population ageing through a rights-based life-cycle approach. ILO’s Older Workers Recommendation, 1980, remains a key labour standard for addressing the employment difficulties that older workers may face because of age. The UN regional commissions, including UNECE, ESCAP, ECLAC and ESCWA, provide regional policy work on ageing, social protection, rights, care systems, labour markets and age-friendly societies.The internal employment at the UN question is also relevant. The UN system cannot credibly call for age-inclusive societies while allowing age bias to shape its own workforce culture. In practice, UN entities usually address age in recruitment through broader non-discrimination, equal-opportunity and prohibited-conduct rules rather than through stand-alone “anti-ageism hiring” policies. The UN Secretariat prohibits discrimination and harassment as prohibited conduct. UN Women’s employment language explicitly includes age among protected characteristics. UNFPA’s organisational culture guidance treats discrimination based on age and other status as prohibited conduct. WHO has strengthened vacancy notices and conduct standards around all forms of discrimination. UNICEF frames diversity and inclusion as part of its workforce policy. UNDP’s standards on non-discrimination and equal opportunity prohibit employment decisions based on personal characteristics unrelated to job requirements.The policy test is therefore practical. Governments, international organisations and employers are being asked to align their language, laws and institutions. Ageing should not be treated as a crisis to be managed at the margins, nor should older persons be reduced to care needs or pension costs. The more serious approach is to build societies where longer lives are reflected in labour markets, health systems, social protection, housing, digital services and public participation.UNECE’s brief is a reminder that narratives are not cosmetic. They can either entrench ageism or widen the political space for better policy. For a UN system focused on sustainable development, human rights and decent work, changing the narrative on ageing is part of the larger task of building societies for all ages.Become a paid subscriber. UN HistoryUN Charter was adopted unanimously and signed 26 June, 1945The ceremony took place at the Veterans War Memorial Building, at the close of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, on June 26, 1945.The Charter had been adopted unanimously the previous day, after weeks of negotiations shaped by the devastation of the Second World War and the determination to build a new system for peace, security, human rights and international law.The countries that signed in San Francisco included Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippine Commonwealth, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, the Union of South Africa and Yugoslavia. Poland, absent from the San Francisco Conference, signed later and became one of the 51 original Members of the United Nations.Among the officials present were figures such as Edward R. Stettinius Jr., US Secretary of State and chair of the US delegation; T. V. Soong, China’s Foreign Minister and chair of the Chinese delegation; the Earl of Halifax, the United Kingdom’s Ambassador to the United States; Alexander Loudon, the Netherlands’ Ambassador to the United States; Miguel Ángel Cárcano, Argentina’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Julian R. Cáceres, Honduras’ Ambassador to the United States; and Clarence L. Simpson, Vice-President of Liberia and chair of the Liberian delegation.Among the 160 signatories of the Charter, only four were women: Bertha Lutz of Brazil, Minerva Bernardino of the Dominican Republic, Virginia Gildersleeve of the United States, and Wu Yi-fang of China.Lutz and Bernardino were central to securing the Charter’s explicit reference to “the equal rights of men and women,” language that helped place gender equality inside the founding text of the United Nations.The Charter itself was negotiated collectively by the delegations in San Francisco, building on earlier wartime proposals. Its Preamble is closely associated with Jan Christiaan Smuts of South Africa, who helped shape the language that still defines the UN’s founding purpose: peace, human rights, dignity, equality and social progress.The Charter’s opening words remain among the most consequential in modern diplomacy: “We the peoples of the United Nations…”Nearly eight decades later, the Charter remains both a legal foundation and a political test. Its purpose was not simply to create an institution. It was to prevent another world war, uphold sovereign equality, reaffirm fundamental human rights, and commit states to collective responsibility.The question today is not whether the Charter still matters. It is whether Member States are prepared to act as if it does.#UnitedNations #UNCharter #SanFranciscoConference #Multilateralism #InternationalLaw #HumanRights #PeaceAndSecurity #TheBrief This is a public episode. 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THE WEEK IN REVIEW​Human Rights CouncilUN Torture Expert Puts Sharper Focus on What Happens After Abuse is DocumentedAt a Geneva press conference on 3 March, Alice Jill Edwards, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, presented her report on a “Charter of Rights of Victims and Survivors of Torture.” The ​report shifts attention from the prohibition of torture alone to the rights, protection and recognition owed to those who have endured it.The report suggests a survivor-centred intervention at a time when accountability debates are increasingly expected to deliver not only legal condemnation but also meaningful redress. ​It places victims and survivors more squarely within the architecture of implementation, not just documentation.This is an effort to articulate a rights-based framework for people subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to push states and institutions to think more concretely about obligations toward rehabilitation, dignity, remedy and recognition.​The report adds weight to a broader trend within the UN human rights system: a move toward survivor-informed policy language and a sharper focus on what happens after abuse is documented.Listen to her intervention at the UN Human Rights Council:Watch her intervention:Thank you for reading THE BRIEF. To support our work consider becoming a paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

Histoire de la Diplomatie Française Dans la géographie politique française, Meudon occupe une position singulière : à l’ombre de Château de Versailles et aux portes de Paris, sur un relief dominant la Seine, la ville a longtemps servi de “seconde scène” du pouvoir. Elle n’est pas seulement un décor de villégiature aristocratique : son histoire croise directement celle de la diplomatie d’État, au moment où la France invente (ou, du moins, systématise) ses instruments de puissance — résidences, courtisans, réseaux de négociateurs, et production administrative.Le premier lien fort entre Meudon et la diplomatie moderne passe par un nom aujourd’hui moins connu du grand public mais central au XVIIe siècle : Abel Servien. C’est l’un des négociateurs français de la paix de Westphalie, l’ensemble de traités de 1648 qui met fin à la guerre de Trente Ans et consolide l’émergence d’un nouvel ordre européen fondé sur des compromis juridiques et territoriaux. Les Archives diplomatiques rappellent qu’à Münster et Osnabrück, la France participe à la construction d’un système international durable qui remodèle l’Europe. Or, quelques années après cette séquence fondatrice, Abel Servien acquiert Meudon (1654), ancrant physiquement, sur ces hauteurs, une figure directement associée à la naissance de la diplomatie de congrès. Meudon devient ainsi, très tôt, un territoire où s’inscrivent dans la pierre les trajectoires des bâtisseurs de l’État négociateur.Sous Louis XIV, cette articulation entre résidence et pouvoir franchit un seuil : la monarchie absolutiste transforme l’espace en instrument politique. À Meudon, l’épisode le plus emblématique est celui du Le Grand Dauphin, héritier de la Couronne. Le site prend alors une dimension quasi institutionnelle : il devient “son” château, un lieu où s’organisent sociabilités, patronages, et circuits d’influence parallèles à Versailles. Le Grand Dauphin y mène de grands travaux et confie notamment des aménagements à Hardouin-Mansart, signe que Meudon est intégré à l’architecture politique du règne. Le Château de Versailles souligne un fait à forte portée symbolique : Le Grand Dauphin meurt à Meudon en avril 1711, au cœur même de ce dispositif résidentiel qui devait incarner la continuité dynastique. Dans une monarchie où la succession et les alliances sont des paramètres diplomatiques majeurs, la résidence de l’héritier n’est jamais neutre : elle est un théâtre où se fabriquent réputations, coalitions et accès au souverain.Ce système ne fonctionne pas sans une machine administrative et financière. Ici, la figure de Jean-Baptiste Colbert est incontournable : au-delà du cliché du “grand argentier”, Jean-Baptiste Colbert incarne l’État organisateur — commerce, marine, industrie, sciences — c’est-à-dire la base matérielle d’une politique de puissance. Le Château de Versailles rappelle l’ampleur de ses charges et son rôle dans le développement de la Marine royale et l’essor des sciences, briques essentielles d’une influence extérieure durable. Meudon, comme Versailles, s’inscrit dans cette même grammaire : le prestige résidentiel, l’art, les collections, les jardins et les travaux ne sont pas seulement du décor, mais une forme de langage diplomatique interne et externe — la mise en scène d’un État capable de mobiliser ressources, talents et savoir-faire.Au XVIIIe siècle, Meudon continue de servir de laboratoire d’influence, mais avec d’autres acteurs et une autre tonalité : celle du “gouvernement de cour” où l’accès et l’intimité comptent autant que les fonctions. C’est ici que s’insère Madame de Pompadour, dont l’empreinte sur Meudon passe notamment par le château de Bellevue, conçu comme résidence de plaisance et espace de réception. Ce lieu n’est pas qu’une fantaisie architecturale : il illustre la manière dont une favorite, devenue confidente, peut créer des espaces de décision “hors protocole”, capables de peser sur certaines affaires politiques. Plus directement encore, des travaux historiques sur “Pompadour and Diplomacy” documentent des rencontres diplomatiques à Bellevue, dans le cadre plus souple des jardins et pavillons, loin des rigidités officielles. Autrement dit : Meudon devient, via Bellevue, un nœud discret où se rencontrent conversation, influence et négociation — une diplomatie de l’ombre, adossée au paysage.Il faut replacer cette dynamique dans un temps long : celui qui va de Westphalie à l’Europe “classique” des congrès et alliances. Westphalie n’est pas “une affaire de Meudon” au sens géographique strict (les traités sont négociés en Allemagne), mais Meudon se relie à cet héritage par deux lignes : d’abord par Abel Servien, négociateur puis propriétaire ; ensuite par la consolidation, sous Louis XIV, d’un État qui comprend que la diplomatie est aussi une affaire de dispositifs — résidences, cérémonial, patronage, et centralisation administrative. Sur ce point, les synthèses historiques rappellent que Westphalie (1648) clôt un cycle de guerres majeures et installe un cadre de négociation qui marque durablement l’Europe. Meudon, dans la proximité immédiate de Versailles, devient l’un des espaces où ce nouvel art de gouverner — entre représentation, secret, et administration — se matérialise.Enfin, Meudon ne s’arrête pas à l’Ancien Régime. Son patrimoine technique et scientifique prolonge, autrement, la logique d’influence : l’industrialisation, l’aéronautique, la culture scientifique et la mise en récit du progrès. Le Hangar Y, construit à partir d’éléments liés à l’Exposition universelle de 1878, rappelle que Meudon s’inscrit aussi dans la diplomatie de l’innovation et des expositions, ces vitrines internationales où les États se comparent et se projettent. (Ce n’est plus la diplomatie des traités et des favorites, mais celle des technologies, des réseaux et de la réputation.En somme, Meudon agit comme un condensé : un lieu où se superposent la diplomatie des négociateurs (Westphalie et Abel Servien), la diplomatie dynastique (le Le Grand Dauphin et son château), la diplomatie de cour (Madame de Pompadour à Bellevue), et la diplomatie de puissance matérielle (l’État colbertien et, plus tard, l’imaginaire industriel et scientifique).L’intérêt est précisément là : lire Meudon non comme une simple banlieue patrimoniale, mais comme un poste d’observation sur la fabrication française de l’influence — celle qui se joue autant dans les salons et les jardins que dans les traités et les administrations.THE BRIEF is supported by paid subscribers. Become a paid subscriber.Interview with the Maire de Meudon, Denis LargheroDenis Larghero est maire de Meudon, une ville dont l’histoire est étroitement liée aux dynamiques du pouvoir et, par ricochet, à la diplomatie française. Située aux portes de Paris et dans l’orbite de Versailles, Meudon a longtemps été un espace stratégique où se sont croisés résidence, influence et décision politique, notamment à l’époque moderne. Dès les XVIe et XVIIe siècles, ce territoire s’inscrit dans l’environnement des grandes familles, des cercles de cour et des réseaux administratifs qui structurent l’action extérieure du royaume, avant de prendre une place plus nette au XVIIe siècle avec la présence d’acteurs associés à la naissance de la diplomatie de congrès et à la consolidation de l’État (puis, sous l’Ancien Régime, avec l’installation de figures proches du pouvoir et la fonction de “contre-scène” de Versailles). Cette continuité se prolonge, sous d’autres formes, jusqu’à aujourd’hui : Meudon demeure un point de contact entre patrimoine institutionnel, attractivité territoriale et projection d’image, dans une région-capitale où se concentrent administrations, ambassades, grandes entreprises, lieux de mémoire et scènes internationales. Dans cette perspective, la ville incarne un fil historique — celui d’une France qui a toujours articulé architecture du pouvoir, réseaux d’influence et capacité à peser sur l’ordre européen — et qui continue, au présent, de faire de son patrimoine et de son positionnement géographique un levier de rayonnement.Sur Denis LargheroSon parcours est étroitement lié à la vie politique des Hauts-de-Seine, où il est également conseiller départemental du canton de Meudon et, au sein du Conseil départemental des Hauts-de-Seine, 5e vice-président en charge de l’attractivité du territoire et du développement numérique. Né en novembre 1968, Denis Larghero s’est formé aux disciplines juridiques et à la science politique : il est indiqué comme licencié en droit public et titulaire d’une maîtrise ainsi que d’un DEA en science politique. Avant d’accéder à la fonction de maire, il occupe des responsabilités au sein de l’équipe municipale, notamment comme adjoint délégué à la culture et au développement numérique, ce qui éclaire deux axes récurrents de son positionnement : d’une part, la valorisation de l’offre culturelle et patrimoniale comme levier d’identité urbaine et d’attractivité ; d’autre part, l’accélération de la transformation numérique de la collectivité (services aux usagers, modernisation des outils de gestion, innovation territoriale). À l’échelle départementale, ses attributions officiellement mentionnées (attractivité du territoire et développement numérique) le placent à l’interface de sujets à forte visibilité : promotion économique, image territoriale, politiques d’innovation, et articulation avec les dynamiques métropolitaines.Son ancrage territorial est souvent décrit comme double : solidement implanté dans l’ouest parisien et conservant un lien marqué avec l’Aveyron, dont il est originaire, notamment à travers des attaches patrimoniales et familiales. Cette dimension « hors-métropole » est parfois mobilisée comme élément de récit public : proximité avec les territoires, rapport au temps long, et sensibilité aux équilibres entre développement urbain et qualité de vie.Dans le paysage politique local, Denis Larghero incarne une figure de maire « gestionnaire » à la fois municipal et intercommunal, évoluant dans un système de gouvernance multiniveaux (commune, département, métropole, établissements publics territoriaux), où la capacité de coalition et la maîtrise des dispositifs administratifs comptent autant que la communication politique. Aujourd’hui, sa biographie publique s’organise donc autour de trois marqueurs principaux : une trajectoire progressive au sein de l’exécutif municipal jusqu’à la prise de la mairie en 2017 et un cumul de responsabilités départementales orientées vers l’attractivité et le numérique.This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.AboutMaya Plentz is the founder and chief editor of THE BRIEF, a weekly newsletter with exclusive interviews and analysis focusing on tech policy, and the global digital economy. She has over two decades of experience in the news media sector. She worked for Kofi Annan at UN Headquarters in New York City, where she was Officer-in-Charge of UN Radio Portuguese Language Unit. Her work aired daily on BBC World, RFI and Bloomberg TV.During her tenure as a producer and presenter at Bloomberg TV in New York, she covered Google, Microsoft, and the 2000 dot-com boom. She also produced a daily segment on science, medicine, and technology. At the UN News and Media Division in New York, she served as a broadcast producer and website news editor, conducting interviews with UN officials, government representatives, and diplomats. Her programs reached millions of viewers weekly across the globe, airing on UN national broadcast partners in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa.As a member of the European Commission High-Level Group of Experts, under the leadership of Pascal Lamy, former WTO Director General and Carlos Moedas, European Commissioner for Research and Innovation, she was tasked with reviewing the EU’s research and innovation funding framework, Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe. She provided advisory on communication strategies to promote innovation funding at the EU. Ms. Plentz is fluent in English, Portuguese, Spanish, and French, and has authored numerous articles and reports, in both English and Portuguese, focusing on the UN and its affiliated agencies.Before she joined the UN she was a professional contemporary dancer, and a research assistant at the Merce Cunningham Dance and Film Foundation. As she transitioned from her performing career she was an instructor of movement for actors at the American Academy of Dramatic Arts, in New York, to prepare actors for camera work and to improve their elocution. After retiring from a performing arts career she returned to university. She graduate from Columbia University in the City of New York, in Political Science, she was awarded scholarships by Columbia University and former US Environment Secretary, Christine T. Whitman. As a non-traditional student with significant professional experience, most of her classes were taken at graduate level, at SIPA, the School of International and Public Affairs, and at Columbia Business School. She was born in Brazil, of German and Italian ancestry.Areas of expertise: Digital Governance Strategy, Artificial Intelligence #AI #TechPolicy #ForeignPolicy This is a public episode. 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In this editionIan Richards on Digital Government This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

UNICEF and Microsoft Partner-upThe UN Brief interviewed Mac Glovinsky to speak about the Learning Passport, a partnership with Microsoft and Cambridge University to accelerate onboarding of children and adolescents in the digital economy, through educational tools.Glovinsky is the Principal Global Program Manager of the Learning Passport, and is based at the UN headquarters in New York. The Learning Passport is an educational tool that allows for learning on-and-offline. They have rolled-out at post-conflict areas, and in developing countries, helping children to continue their education and allowing them to carry their curriculum wherever they are, as they will eventually move out of refugee camps and thanks to these tools will be able to continue their studies at the appropriate grade level.These are one of the many ways that new technologies are supporting the continuity of education in what are very trying situations for these children and their families.We cover emerging technologies and how they impact international cooperation. Subscribe to The UN Brief for exclusive interviews with UN officials, diplomats, business leaders and academics for insights in the digital transformation of multilateral organizations, and the emerging technologies that are impacting international cooperation.Subscribers have:1. Early access to exclusive content, videos and podcasts, with insights and analysis of current affairs topics.2. Invitation to talks (virtual now) with the key players in Foreign Policy and Tech.3. Participation in round-tables on the future of multilateralism.4. A monthly update, closed to members-only, video call to discuss trends with diplomats, academics, government, and tech leaders.And much more to come in the coming months. Stay tuned. Looking forward to interacting with you all,Maya PlentzEditor in ChiefSubscribe to our newsletter This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

On this edition:* A weekend in Bourgogne.* Discover the history of Cremant de Bourgogne.* Sustainability in wine production. THE BRIEF is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a paid subscriber.Bourgogne in the SpotlightPondering what to do during the sweltering days of Summer in Geneva? No vacation time left? I suggest you go visit Bourgogne and discover its many food and wine offers. It is paradise for very affordable high-quality wines to wines for special occasions and to, above all, educating your senses.Did you know that Bourgogne wines that can be kept for several years are also a good investment? As an asset class Burgundy wines beat some traditional categories, not to say the investment in pleasure, as the British wine critic Steven Spurrier used to say. “Fine wine is also an investment in pleasure.”We had the pleasure of visiting three wine producers from the region last month.Keep your eyes pricked for the stories and interviews with the winemakers that are representing the best of sustainability and quality from the region at a global scale.Wines from Bourgogne are becoming better known in Brazil, this past month the BIVB, the Bureau Interprofessionel des Vins de Bourgogne, visited Brazil for the first time.Their latest research shows growing exports to the region, in fine restaurants, and by the recommendations of experts in gastronomy. Pairing the delightful Cremant de Bourgogne with Brazilian exquisite seafood and prime-cut barbecues is becoming a thing, with importers realizing the price/quality value and its potential with consumers and restaurateurs alike.In a country where prosecco and champagne reign supreme, given its tropical weather, as a refreshing, celebratory drink, and increasingly in cocktails by renowned bartenders at the Copacabana Palace and Fasano’s (the French architect Philippe Starck designed luxury hotel) Cremant de Bourgogne has already a market in Brazil expecting bubbly happiness drinks, that just needs to be developed to gain market share.One of our visits was to the Maison Louis Picamelot.We interviewed Louis Picamelot’s grandson, now producer and CEO of the Maison, Philippe Chautard. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

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Presented by EVO Fitness GenevaGet THE BRIEF special May offer with promo code 9NY Sign up here.7-Day Free Trial – No Commitment & No Joining FeeFind out more about EVO Fitness philosophy.A great place to work out, open 7 days from 6 AM to 11 PM.UN Ministerial Reaffirms Multilateral Commitment Amid Global FractureThe 2025 United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial, held in Berlin from 13–14 May, convened by the German government and attended by representatives from over 130 UN Member States and partner organizations.Peacekeeping missions, once symbols of collective resolve, now operate under increasingly constrained mandates, diminished legitimacy in host countries, and growing exposure to asymmetric threats.Germany pledged €82 million in new commitments while encouraging others to match ambition with substance. “We want to tailor future missions to the exact needs of the host countries and increase their acceptance and effectiveness,” said Johann Wadephul, Germany’s Foreign Minister, echoing what has become a leitmotif in Western diplomatic discourse: local ownership, global partnership.Defense Minister Boris Pistorius emphasized innovation, announcing German investment in renewable energy for field operations, medical drones, and counter-IED technologies. While 74 countries made formal pledges—including 88 military and police units and support for women, peace and security initiatives—the subtext of the conference revealed fissures in political will and coherence. The geographic and political diversity of the pledging states obscures the uneven distribution of actual deployment. It is countries from the Global South—Bangladesh, Rwanda, Nepal—that continue to provide the bulk of troops, while the industrialized North often positions itself as financier and advisor.Meanwhile, the thematic emphasis on technological modernization and “data-driven peacekeeping” betrays an uncomfortable truth: the impulse to technocratize peacekeeping may be a response to deeper political paralysis. Rather than confront the structural drivers of conflict—economic inequality, climate displacement, neocolonial resource extraction—the international community risks outsourcing peace to algorithms and AI-powered surveillance.Berlin was also a staging ground for long-standing, unresolved debates: How to reform command structures to avoid past failures in Mali, the DRC, and South Sudan? How to ensure accountability in cases of abuse by peacekeepers? How to harmonize competing interests within the Security Council? Eleven states pledged action on accountability and conduct, including support for victims of sexual exploitation, but mechanisms for independent oversight remain weak.Furthermore, the commitments to “strategic communications” and countering disinformation reflect a growing awareness that peacekeeping missions are not merely military deployments but contested narratives in the information sphere. Yet the risk remains that this concern for “information integrity” may prioritize reputation management over transparency and local engagement.The Berlin Ministerial was laden with symbolism: it coincided with the 80th anniversary of the United Nations and the 10-year mark since the 2015 Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping. But anniversaries can conceal as much as they reveal. Today, over 61,000 military and police peacekeepers are deployed across 11 missions—often in settings where the UN is simultaneously viewed as indispensable and insufficient.Whether the Berlin pledges mark a renaissance or merely a rhetorical reaffirmation depends not on declarations made in conference halls, but on the lived realities in places like Abyei, Beni, or Gao. Peacekeeping, once imagined as the moral arm of a rules-based order, now treads a narrow path between relevance and retreat.The next chapter, as always, will be written in the field. And for that, political courage—not just strategic planning—remains in shortest supply.Cabo Verde at a Crossroads: Resilient Recovery or Structural Dependence?A small island developing state in the Atlantic with fewer than half a million inhabitants, Cabo Verde has long stood as a symbol of political stability and democratic governance in West Africa. Yet behind its pro-democracy credentials lies a fragile economy dependent on tourism, remittances, and a narrow export base. The latest Trade Policy Review by the World Trade Organization (WTO) offers a glimpse into the country’s mixed progress—a cautious recovery on the surface, with deeper structural dependencies beneath.After suffering a dramatic 20.8% contraction in GDP in 2020, Cabo Verde posted an impressive 15.8% rebound in 2022, stabilizing at 5.5% in 2023. Much of this recovery is credited to the revival of international tourism, which alone brought in over USD 468 million in 2023. Remittances—constituting nearly 11% of GDP—further buoyed domestic demand.However, these gains are precarious. The country’s trade-to-GDP ratio, a telling indicator of openness and vulnerability, peaked above 105% before the pandemic, only to drop to 75% and gradually recover to 95% by 2023. The merchandise trade deficit remains steep: USD 1.76 billion in imports against just USD 383 million in exports. More than 80% of the country’s food is imported.A Narrow Base: Tourism, Re-Exports, and FishThe backbone of Cabo Verde’s economy is services, particularly tourism and transport. Strategic geography has also turned the archipelago into a logistical hub for re-exports—especially fuels and vehicles. Exports of mineral products (largely re-exports of fuels) accounted for 61% of all merchandise trade in 2023. Meanwhile, processed seafood, mostly tuna, now makes up over 84% of domestically produced exports, highlighting the country’s limited industrial and agricultural capacity.Despite repeated calls for export diversification, Cabo Verde’s export concentration index remains four times the global average, exposing it to significant external shocks.Structural Bottlenecks and Bureaucratic DragTrade facilitation has improved on paper: a foreign trade portal launched in 2023, customs costs have decreased, and legislative transparency has advanced. Still, businesses face lengthy customs clearance (averaging over six days in Praia), high import compliance costs (19% of goods value), and complex licensing systems that deter small traders.The absence of an Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) scheme, persistent tariff inconsistencies with WTO commitments, and cumbersome tax exemptions only deepen inefficiencies. Almost a third of surveyed firms cite customs procedures as a severe constraint—well above African and global averages.An Unequal and Concentrated EconomyWomen remain clustered in low-tech sectors with limited access to credit and trade networks, despite a 2019 parity law. Market monopolies continue to plague key sectors: one tour operator dominates the industry, and domestic flights are held by a single carrier. A newly created competition authority in 2022 has yet to dismantle these entrenched positions.State-owned enterprises remain prominent, accounting for over 17% of GDP in revenue—but also dragging public finances, with the three largest SOEs posting losses equal to a quarter of GDP in 2021.The Illusion of OpennessCabo Verde is a signatory to both the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and several WTO agreements, including the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement (2024). It also enjoys preferential market access to the EU (GSP+) and the U.S. (AGOA). Yet trade under these schemes remains limited, raising doubts about the country's actual capacity to capitalize on global opportunities.The promise of integration into global digital and renewable energy markets looms large, with the government aiming for 50% renewable energy production by 2030. But these ambitions contrast with ongoing infrastructure challenges and high dependency on refined oil imports.Tourism’s Double-Edged SwordTourism remains the economic engine—but also the Achilles heel. Most tourists come from Europe, and disruptions such as pandemics, climate shocks, or geopolitical instability could once again halt growth. The government’s Strategic Tourism Plan (2018–2030) seeks to address sustainability, but the sector remains ecologically intensive and socioeconomically uneven.Cabo Verde's story is one of cautious optimism. Its political stability, gradual reforms, and external partnerships offer promise. But its economic model—built on tourism, remittances, and a narrow export base—remains vulnerable. Without diversifying production, streamlining governance, and tackling monopolies, the nation risks being trapped in a cycle of dependency. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

Interview with Danish Masood, former UN official in charge of innovation and experimenting with the metaverse. How did they analyzed the peace and security landscape in conflict zones.Bringing AR/VR to the UN Security Council.Too much, too soon?Presented by EVO Fitness GenevaGet THE BRIEF special May offer with promo code 9NY Sign up here.7-Day Free Trial – No Commitment & No Joining FeeFind out more about EVO Fitness philosophy.A great place to work out, open 7 days from 6 AM to 11 PM.UN to Cut Posts, Relocate Services in Major Overhaul Ahead of 80th AnniversaryAs the United Nations approaches the 80th anniversary of its founding charter, Secretary-General António Guterres has unveiled a sweeping reform initiative aimed at reshaping the Organization to better meet today’s global challenges — and do so more efficiently.At the heart of the UN80 Initiative is a bold push to streamline operations, reduce redundancies, and cut costs — including through workforce reductions and relocating staff away from high-cost duty stations like New York and Geneva.The reform is driven by three workstreams: achieving operational efficiencies, reviewing how the UN implements its mandates, and exploring structural changes across the system.Significant Personnel Cuts ExpectedIn one of the most striking announcements, the Secretary-General revealed that up to 20% of posts in the Peace and Security departments — DPPA and DPO — are expected to be eliminated. These reductions stem from efforts to merge overlapping units, eliminate duplicated functions, and consolidate similar activities across the UN system.“These are difficult but necessary decisions,” said Guterres, acknowledging the human cost of such restructuring. “Our concern is to be humane and professional in dealing with any aspect of the required restructuring.”The impact will extend beyond these two departments. Every Secretariat entity has been asked to identify roles that can be moved to lower-cost locations or cut altogether, especially those not directly serving intergovernmental bodies.Consolidation of Services and OfficesThe plan also targets administrative and logistical functions. Shared IT platforms, centralized support services, and automation are key components of the new operating model.Several buildings in New York have already been vacated, with two more expected to close by 2027 — a move projected to generate substantial savings. Staff will be moved into existing premises, and future operations will likely be run from more cost-effective locations.“Relocating posts from high-cost cities is not just about budget savings — it’s about rethinking where and how we work,” said Catherine Pollard, Under-Secretary-General for Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance, who is leading the efficiency review.Thousands of Mandates Under ReviewThe second pillar of the reform reviews how the UN implements the more than 3,600 unique mandates it has been given — not their content, but the processes behind them. The review aims to identify overlapping efforts and opportunities for simplification and synergy across the UN system.Guterres was candid: “Most of these problems are not only still with us — they have intensified. We must do better.”Long-Term ImpactWhile some reforms will be implemented as early as the 2026 revised programme budget, deeper changes — including those with structural implications — will appear in the 2027 budget proposal.“The level of reduction in the peace and security cluster should serve as a reference point across the organization,” Guterres said. Still, he emphasized the importance of preserving geographic, gender, and disability balance in staffing.A Defining MomentThe UN80 Initiative coincides with a broader push to implement the Pact for the Future and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. But its legacy may hinge on whether Member States and staff can navigate the growing pains of transformation.“Change is never easy — but it is essential,” Guterres concluded. “The success of this initiative depends on all of us living up to our shared responsibilities.”THE BRIEF is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a paid subscriber.Where it will happen?The United Nations is preparing to substantially streamline operations in its two major headquarters, New York and Geneva, as part of the Secretary-General’s ambitious UN80 Initiative to modernize the Organization ahead of its 80th anniversary.Designed to strengthen delivery, improve efficiency, and reduce costs, the reform effort comes amid growing fiscal pressure, stagnant funding, and mounting global challenges.Key Changes Affecting New York and GenevaBoth cities — long seen as operational anchors of the UN system — will undergo targeted consolidation of personnel and services.Functions that are not directly tied to the work of Member States in intergovernmental bodies — such as the General Assembly in New York or the Human Rights Council in Geneva — are now being evaluated for relocation, reduction, or discontinuation.Initial plans include:* Elimination of up to 20% of posts in the peace and security pillar (DPPA/DPO),* Termination of leases in New York, with two more buildings expected to close by 2027,* Mandated review by all Secretariat offices in both cities to assess whether functions can be moved to lower-cost duty stations, such as Nairobi, Santiago, or Kuala Lumpur,* Structural realignment across departments, including merging overlapping units and consolidating reporting lines.Diplomatic ImpactOfficials emphasized that intergovernmental support functions will remain in place. The reductions will primarily affect back-office, administrative, or technical units.Nonetheless, diplomatic missions in New York and Geneva can expect to interface with smaller, more integrated UN teams, and may see changes in coordination channels and reporting structures.“The goal is to concentrate the diplomatic and policy interface in these two locations, while relocating support and management elsewhere,” said one senior UN official involved in the reform.Consultations and TimelineThe reforms are unfolding in phases:* Immediate efficiencies will be reflected in revised 2026 budget estimates, due in September.* Larger structural changes will be built into the 2027 programme budget.* All affected staff are being engaged through consultative mechanisms.Member States are expected to review and approve several proposals in the Fifth Committee and General Assembly plenaries over the coming months.Looking AheadGeneva and New York will remain central to UN diplomacy. However, they are being reimagined as strategic convening spaces, rather than all-purpose operational hubs.The Secretary-General framed the changes as essential to long-term sustainability and credibility:“We cannot allow the architecture of multilateralism to become outdated or inefficient. This is a moment to act with purpose — to deliver more by doing better.”The UN80 Initiative is a structural overhaul with political, operational, and budgetary consequences — especially for Member States with permanent missions in New York and Geneva.Active participation and coordinated engagement will be key in shaping what the future UN will look like — and where it will do its work.THE BRIEF is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a paid subscriber.UN80 Initiative: Reforming for the FutureNext month marks 80 years since the signing of the United Nations Charter — a document that has guided global peace, development, and human rights since 1945.But anniversaries aren’t just for reflection. They’re a call to action.Today, the United Nations faces a complex world — one defined by conflict, economic pressure, environmental crisis, and technological upheaval. The UN80 Initiative is about making the Organization fit for the next 80 years.UN80: A Time for RenewalSo, what’s changing?The Secretary-General has launched a three-part transformation of the UN system, focusing on:* Efficiency and cost reduction,* Mandate implementation, and* Structural overhaul.This isn’t reform for reform’s sake. It’s about ensuring that resources match real needs, and that every dollar and every position counts.A major part of this transformation is streamlining the workforce — especially in high-cost duty stations like New York and Geneva. Some functions that don’t directly serve intergovernmental bodies will be relocated or phased out.Administrative consolidation, automation, and centralized IT services are on the table. So are potential layoffs and post eliminations in areas where duplication or inefficiency is identified.In fact, the Peace and Security cluster — including the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations — is expected to reduce staff by up to 20%, cutting duplication and merging overlapping functions.These are bold changes with human implications. Staff representatives are being consulted, and every decision is promised to be humane and transparent.The goal isn’t just to save money — though the budget reductions will be significant.It’s to refocus the UN on impact: on making a difference in people’s lives. Not through more reports or meetings, but through leaner, smarter operations.The UN80 Initiative will shape the next generation of multilateralism. That means structural consolidation, new business models, and clarity of mission.Because the challenges of the future won’t wait — and neither should we.This is the United Nations at a turning point — committed to doing more, by doing better. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe