Now that the anarchy was over, a reduced but reunited Abbasid military could finally face up to the multitude of threats facing the caliphate. A slave insurrection in the south of Iraq was one of the earliest challenges it had to contend with, and the state’s slow and faltering response revealed the extent of the decline of Abbasid power. The caliphate did ultimately come out on top, thanks to the assiduous regent general Talha, and his worthy son Ahmad.

The death of Salih ibn Waseef left Musa ibn Bugha in charge of the caliphate’s armies. This newfound unity effectively ended the Anarchy in Samarra which had plagued the Abbasid state for almost a decade. While the dark period of civil war was over, the Abbasid state now had to contend with its consequences and the many dangers it spawned.

Dilapidated by years of internal conflict and ruinous mismanagement, the caliphate was a mere shadow of its former self. The void left by its collapse had led to the rise of adversaries which now surrounded the capital province and threatened the state’s very existence. Not only was the treasury empty, but the state’s armies were divided and their leaders still quarreled over scraps. These were the unfortunate conditions of al Muhtadi’s reign, and the powerless caliph could do little to reform the situation.

Instead of bringing about a measure of peace, the end of the civil war signaled a return to the anarchy that had preceded it. The new caliph was restricted by the same men whose influence had checked his predecessor’s. Furthermore, by accepting the role of a puppet, al Musta’in had sullied the Abbasid name and done irreparable damage to the caliph’s authority in the eyes of the umma, and more critically, the troops. Also did I mention that the caliphate was broke?

As the last vestiges of Abbasid authority crumbled, the caliphate spiraled further into chaos. It wasn’t too long before an unremarkable conflict sparked a much wider conflagration and the umma was engulfed by civil war. The turks treated the Abbasids as little more than a banner, and each side rallied behind the candidate they understood would look after their interests the best. The fitna of 865 proved disastrous to Baghdad and Iraq, but the rest of the umma seemed to enjoy the downfall of the unpopular Turks, and they capitalized on their absence by exercising more independence.

Al Muntasir’s sudden passing took the caliphate into uncharted political territory. It had only been six months since the plot against his father had succeeded, and he was still much too young for succession planning. The Turks tried to capitalize on this disaster: in an attempt to make the most out of the situation they installed a figurehead in command, one they could control with impunity. Little did they know that in doing so they were kicking Pandora’s box wide open.

It’s difficult to overstate the impact al Mutawakkil’s usurpation had on the political reality of the caliphate. Not only did it completely hijack control of the state, but it also had decisive implications for the nature and locus of official authority. We’ll kick off our journey into this brave new world with the short reign of al Muntasir. Its unexpected end will unfortunately only make the umma’s politics more volatile. Things were bad, but they’re about to become a whole lot worse.

Succession planning presented a sporadic problem for the caliphate. The great fitna was the last disaster spawned by ill-conceived designs, and it proved absolutely ruinous to the state. Al Mutawakkil’s arrangement was so bad that it became the first to snare the caliph himself in its chaos. As with most things about him, there’s no consensus on what happened or why. Al Mutawakkil’s reign and character are subjects of considerable disagreement, complicating any assessment of this caliph’s legacy.

Despite the religious overtones of the caliphate, there was nothing very islamic about the state when it came to policy. The inquisition marked the first time an administration tried to interfere in matters of faith, and it intensified over the reigns of three caliphs. Al Mutawakkil put an end to the mihna, and reversed the state’s position on a slew of related matters. His new direction proved popular with the masses, but it discriminated heavily against a wide range of communities.

Considering their invincibility on the battlefield, the caliphate’s armies probably felt assured that they would remain the state’s number one priority. Al Mutawakkil’s purge of the administration only touched one member of the military hierarchy, and the caliph could not kill off its leadership if he required an effective fighting force. Although he sought to weaken the Turkish grip on the military, al Mutawakkil still needed them to win his many, many wars. Neither side could do without the other, but it was an uneasy relationship as the caliph looked for ways out of it.