The ACRI Podcast

In this episode of the UTS:ACRI Podcast’s new series delivering analysis of COVID-19 and its impacts within the context of the Australia-China relationship, UTS:ACRI Director Professor James Laurenceson is joined by Professor Xie Tao, Dean of the School of International Relations and Diplomacy at Beijing Foreign Studies University and UTS:ACRI Adjunct Professor, to discuss the potential impacts of COVID-19 on the US-China relationship, Australia’s geopolitical environment and the Australia-China relationship.

In this episode of the UTS:ACRI Podcast’s new series delivering analysis of COVID-19 and its impacts within the context of the Australia-China relationship, UTS:ACRI Director Professor James Laurenceson is joined by Dr Jeffrey Wilson, Research Director at the Perth USAsia Centre and a specialist in the regional economic integration of the Indo-Pacific, to discuss the implications of COVID-19 for Australian imports, integration with global supply-chains and its foreign investment environment.

As the unprecedented public health impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic continue to permeate into both daily life and the broader currents of international affairs, it is clear that what began as an outbreak of a novel coronavirus in mainland China has mutated into a globalised ‘grey rhino’ event with significant second-order implications for the Australia-China relationship. In this special edition of the UTS:ACRI Podcast, UTS:ACRI Director Professor James Laurenceson discusses these implications amid concerns around the Australia-China economic relationship, which now sees exports to mainland China accounting for seven percent of Australia’s GDP. An important piece of context is that despite political and diplomatic tensions, goods exports to mainland China in the year to January 2020 reached $150 billion. This was up 26 percent on the year to January 2019, with services exports growing by eight percent over the same period. This means that negative economic effects will be coming off a high base. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that mainland China’s economy has been subject to significant disruption since January. While forecasting currently projects a severe contraction in the first quarter of 2020, the mainland Chinese economy is expected to recover to 4.5 percent GDP growth by December, a 1.5 percentage point decrease compared to the previous year. However, a weaker recovery cannot be ruled out, with some forecasts predicting much lower growth. Testifying to this are official data from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government such as purchasing manager’s indexes – measures of business sentiment and activity – which hit record lows in January and February, lower than market expectations and unofficial indexes. The impacts of this downturn are likely to be felt unevenly across sectors of Australia’s economy as the relationship between mainland China’s economic growth and its demand for imports is not 1:1. An indicative case is that of PRC visitors flows to Australia, where heterogeneity between reasons for visiting mean that while tourist visitor numbers have been almost completely curtailed, a smaller proportion of visitors coming for education are affected, with 50 percent of student visa holders from mainland China onshore by March 1. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has seen the revival of commentary arguing that Australia is economically ‘too dependent’ on the PRC. However, COVID-19 is clearly now a global shock rather than a PRC-specific one, meaning that while Australia’s exports to the mainland Chinese market will decline, so too will exports to other markets. Further, it is likely that mainland China will be the first major economy to recover, despite significant headwinds.

An increasingly scrutinised aspect of Australia's relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is collaboration – particularly between universities – in scientific research, especially into what are deemed sensitive fields such as artificial intelligence (AI). Artificial intelligence (AI) has in in recent years received widespread attention for its potential to transform vast swathes of the global economy and global society. While there might be many opportunities presented by the new frontiers of AI and the swift advances in the design and harnessing of its technologies, there is also great potential for such technologies to be abused and applied to undesirable ends. The PRC’s position among global leaders in the development and uptake of such technologies means that research collaboration fittingly receives critical examination. How can Australia respond to the risks and benefits of collaborating with the PRC in AI research? The Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS:ACRI) recently released a research paper examining this issue. One of the paper’s co-authors, Michael Zhou, a researcher at UTS:ACRI, joins Elena Collinson, senior researcher at UTS:ACRI, to discuss PRC advancements in AI, trends in Australia’s collaboration with the PRC in artificial intelligence research and the benefits and risks attached to it.

Nationalism has a complex history in post-Qing dynasty China, such that there are few – if any – absolutes in the conceptualisations and manifestations of its various forms. However, it has retained several distinct characteristics throughout the 20th century and early 21st century. Common premises include both pride in ‘5000 years of Chinese civilisation’ and victimhood during China’s ‘century of humiliation’ by the West and by Japan. The underlying narrative now, however, is shifting further to one rooted in pride, in parallel with China’s rise. When one contemplates modern Chinese nationalism, what does it look like and how is it shaped and propagated? How does it manifest in the general populace and how is it harnessed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? To what extent has nationalism, at least in the form espoused by the CCP, been correlated with or acted as a euphemism for Han ethnocentrism? The ‘rising tide of Chinese nationalism’ is often invoked in discussions on China. To what extent does this phrase ring true? The enmeshing of the PRC in the global order means that Chinese nationalism is likely to have some bearing on its foreign relations. But to what extent? And what does Chinese nationalism mean for Australia and its engagement with China? Rowan Callick OBE, author, columnist and former China correspondent for The Australian and The Australian Financial Review, joins Elena Collinson, senior researcher at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney (UTS:ACRI) to discuss these questions and more.

Conceptually defined as a program of connectivity enhancement and written into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) charter in 2017, the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a key pillar of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) foreign policy agenda. But the BRI is the subject of strong criticism, seen as it is as Beijing’s strategy to erode the liberal rules-based order and reshape regional norms in its own favour, as well as allegations of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’. What is the driving imperative behind the BRI? What are the strategic interests underlying it and how successful has the BRI been in realising them? How has the BRI evolved over the last few years? In Australia, the federal government’s response to the BRI thus far might be characterised as ‘cautious openness’, having expressed in-principle support for greater infrastructure development in the region and a policy of engagement on a case-by-case basis. But there are many concerns around project governance and transparency held not just by Australia, but by numerous other like-minded countries who have yet to substantively engage with the BRI. What does the BRI mean for Australia? How has Australia responded, and what should it do in the future? The BRI also includes a technological dimension – the Digital Silk Road – that seeks to shape norms in the regulation of emerging technologies. What has been the uptake of this technological statecraft by countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands who have ‘signed up’, so to speak, to the BRI, and what might this mean for Australia? Dirk van der Kley, Program Director of Policy Research at China Matters, joins Elena Collinson, senior researcher at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney (UTS:ACRI), to discuss the BRI, its economic and technological dimensions and the implications for Australia. Also discussed is Australia’s response to the BRI to date, and policies Australia might consider adopting in future.

The development and uptake of cyber-systems has been rapid and widespread in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC government has consequently sought to develop a stronger cybersecurity policy, with President Xi Jinping personally taking control of the Cyberspace Administration of China. It also seeks to promote its concept of cyber-sovereignty. However, the PRC’s use of cyber-capabilities at a state-level have come under international scrutiny and criticism, with other countries, including Australia, becoming increasingly concerned about state-sponsored cyber-espionage attacks. Another worrying development is that state efforts to exert control over PRC citizens have increased in parallel with increasing technological capabilities. What is the current state of China’s cyber-capability, and what does it aspire to going forward? How has this played out in the global arena? And how might it affect Australia? Greg Austin, Deputy Director of UNSW Canberra Cyber, joins James Laurenceson, Deputy Director of the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney, to discuss cybersecurity developments in China, China’s cyber strategy globally and the ramifications for Australia.

As the Australia-China bilateral relationship has grown since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1972, discourse on the relationship has tended to be dominated by economic and strategic issues. Human rights are a part of the relationship that sometimes struggles to get the attention given to developments in the economic and strategic realms. Yet it is no less pressing. In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) seeks greater participation in, and leadership of, the global order through both ‘hard’ power and ‘soft’ power. However, its growing international clout correlates with growing concern from members of the international community around adherence – or lack thereof – to international standards of human rights. How does the PRC view human rights, and how has the treatment of human rights issues in the PRC evolved over time? Last year, governments and observers like Human Rights Watch noted with significant concern reports on the mass internment of up to a million ethnic Uighurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. The PRC’s opaque legal system has been another source of perturbation, with PRC and non-PRC citizens subject to arbitrary detention, often with basic rights – such as that to legal representation – denied. How have Australian responses to such issues evolved? And going forward, how should Australia manage dialogue with the PRC on human rights issues? This episode of the ACRI podcast brings together two former Australian career diplomats to discuss these questions: Jocelyn Chey, currently a visiting professor at the University of Sydney, and Richard Broinowski, a prominent public affairs commentator. James Laurenceson, Deputy Director of the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS) hosts the episode.

As China’s domestic economy and per capita income has grown since the beginning of the Chinese government’s ‘reform and opening up’ strategy, the opportunities presented by the Chinese market for global businesses have become widely known. Yet the bulk of international attention is focused on a few large cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou, colloquially known as Bei-Shang-Guang-Shen. A 2017 Morgan Stanley report argued that private consumption in China could grow to US $9.7 trillion by 2030, with a major proportion of that growth being driven by smaller cities outside of the major commercial hubs around Bei-Shang-Guang-Shen - the metropolises recognised as “tier one cities”. What exactly is the tier system, and how are cities assigned to tiers? Might we expect cities currently in non-tier ones to grow to become comparable to cities currently in high tiers? What kinds of opportunities and challenges might Australian businesses encounter – or indeed, have already encountered – as they consider entry into markets in these non-tier one cities? Nick Henderson, Director of Asialink Business China Practice, joins James Laurenceson, Deputy Director of ACRI, to discuss the tier system of China’s cities, commercial opportunities beyond the tier 1 cities, the on-the-ground reality experienced by companies looking to do business there, and more.

The Pacific has become much more central to foreign policy discussions in Australia over the last few years, with clear political bipartisanship on the need to forge closer ties with Pacific nations. Prime Minister Scott Morrison in November last year declared that Australia would ‘step up’ in the Pacific and take its engagement with the region to ‘a new level’. Opposition Leader Bill Shorten pledged in parallel that ‘a Labor Government will put the Pacific front and centre in our regional foreign policy’. Prime Minister Morrison during his November Pacific ‘step up’ speech announced a vast swathe of initiatives across the diplomatic, military, financial and people-to-people realms for engagement with countries in the Pacific. What are the major driving forces behind Australia’s Pacific ‘step-up’, and how has it been received by Pacific nations? Australia’s increasing focus on the Pacific has come against the backdrop of increased engagement by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with Pacific nations and Australian concerns about the regional balance of power. A major question that policymakers and analysts are grappling with is what the motivations behind China’s activities in the Pacific are. What is the nature of the PRC’s engagement with the Pacific, and how effective is it? How have Australian and PRC initiatives been received by Pacific nations thus far? And what scope might there be for cooperation between Australia, the PRC, and Pacific nations in regional development? Dr Tess Newton Cain, an independent researcher and consultant with over 20 years of experience in governance, policy and political analysis of the Pacific Islands region, joins Elena Collinson, senior researcher at the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS) to discuss these questions and more. Dr Newton Cain provides insights on the Australian strategic debate with respect to the PRC and the Pacific, the PRC’s ambitions in the region, as well as – importantly – the views of Pacific nations, and more.