The Court’s decision in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), held that the Constitution’s fundamental federal structure does not permit Congress to “directly . . . compel the States to require or prohibit [certain] acts.” In September 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq., against a constitutional challenge under New York by construing PASPA’s proscription against States “authoriz[ing]” sports wagering “by law” narrowly to prohibit only the “affirmative ‘authorization by law’ of gambling schemes,” and not repeals by States of exist- ing sports wagering prohibitions. After New Jersey then proceeded to repeal certain of its prohibitions on sports wagering in specified venues in the State, the en banc court reversed course and interpreted PASPA as making it “unlawful” for New Jersey to repeal its prohibitions and affirmed an injunction that requires the State to reinstate the repealed state-law prohibitions. The court then held that it was constitutional for federal law to dictate the extent to which States must maintain their prohibitions on sports wagering. The question presented is: Does a federal statute that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law prohibitions on private conduct impermissibly commandeer the regulatory power of States in contravention of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)?

On this episode we review the Court's recent decision in Buck v. Davis, wherein the Court considers whether Mr. Buck's trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for knowingly presenting an “expert” who testified that Mr. Buck was more likely to be dangerous in the future because he is Black, where future dangerousness was both a prerequisite for a death sentence and the central issue at sentencing.

On this episode, we review the oral arguments last week in Lee v. Tam. Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), provides that no trademark shall be refused registration on account of its nature unless, inter alia, it "[c]onsists of . . . matter which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute." The question presented by the case is whether the disparagement provision in 15 U.S.C. 1052(a) is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

On this episode we consider a delay granted by the Court in Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., a case which the Supreme Court was expected to hear this Term concerning whether states are bound by a Department of Education interpretation of Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.33, which provides that a funding recipient providing sex-separated facilities must “generally treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity.”

On this episode we review the Court's recent grant of review to the case of Los Angeles County v. Mendez, which considers the merits of the Ninth Circuit's application of its "Provocation Rule" and whether that rule conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. Under the “provocation” rule, an officer may be held responsible for an otherwise reasonable use of force where the officer intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent confrontation, and the provocation was itself an independent Fourth Amendment violation.

Whether it violates the Eighth Amendment and this Court’s decisions in Hall v. Florida and Atkins v. Virginia to prohibit the use of current medical standards on intellectual disability, and require the use of outdated medical standards, in determining whether an individual may be executed.

On this episode, we review the Court's recent grant of review to Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., which considers whether courts should extend deference to an unpublished agency letter that requires publicly funded schools to "treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity” in the use of bathrooms.

On this episode we discuss a case to be heard in oral arguments this week concerning a rule of evidence that prohibits the introduction of juror testimony regarding statements made during deliberations when offered to challenge the jury’s verdict. The question here is whether that rule applies when a defendant is attempting to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment's "right to an impartial jury."

This term the Court considers the case of Lee v. Tam, which considers whether Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), is constitutional. Section 2(a) prohibits the registration of a trademark that “may disparage ... persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” In this case, the Government denied a trademark to "The Slants," an Asian-American rock band based in Portland. In choosing to name the band "The Slants," Simon Tam sought to make a statement on discrimination against Asian-Americans.

On this episode we review the Court's decision in McDonnell v. United States, which considers whether a former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell was given a fair trial when he was convicted under the federal bribery statute (18 U. S. C. §201), which makes it a crime for “a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly” to demand, seek, receive, accept, or agree “to receive or accept anything of value” in return for being “influenced in the performance of any official act.” Specifically, the Court considered whether it was appropriate for the trial court to refuse Governor McDonnell's request to specifically instruct the jury that “merely arranging a meeting, attending an event, hosting a reception, or making a speech are not, standing alone, ‘official acts."