Tim A. Koslowski (New Brunswick) gives a talk at the Mini-Workshop on the Foundations of Shape Dynamics (23 June, 2014) titled "Shape Dynamics". Abstract: Based on the introduction to shape dynamics by Sean Gryb, I will discuss the question: "Given that gravity (from the perspective of shape dynamics) is fundamentally the evolution of spatial conformal geometry and not spacetime: How is the arrow of time generated? How is the illusion of a spacetime generated? What are the limitations of the spacetime description? I will give explicit answers to several aspect of these questions and I will explain where the uncharted territory begins.

Igor Khavkine (Utrecht) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Quantum Gravity in Perspective" (31 May-1 June, 2013) titled "Gravity. An exercise in quantization". Abstract: The quantization of General Relativity (GR) is an old and chellenging prob- lem that is in many ways still awaiting a satisfactory solution. GR is a partic- ularly complicated field theory in several respects: non-linearity, gauge invari- ance, dynamibal causal structure, renormalization, singularities, infared effects. Fortunately, much progress has been made on each of these fronts. Our under- standing of these problems has evolved greatly over the past century, together with our understandig of quantum field theory (QFT) in general. Today, the state of the art in QFT knows how to address each of these challenges, as they occur in isolation in ohter field theories. There is still an active research program aiming to combine the relevant methods and apply them to GR. But, at the very least, the problem of the quantization of GR can be formulated as a well defined mathematical question. On the other hand, quantum GR also faces a different set of obstacles: timelessness, non-renormalizability, naturality, unification, which reflect, not its technical difficulty, but rather the aesthetic and philosophical preferences of practing theoretical physicists. I will briefly discuss how the technical state of the art and a scientifically conservative philosophical position make these obstacles irrelevant. Time per- mitting, I will also briefly touch on some aspects of the state of technical state of the art that have turned the quantization of GR into a (still challenging) exercise: covariant Poisson structure, BV-BRST treatment of gauge theories, deformation quantization, Epstein-Glaser renormalization.

Karim Thébault (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (9 January, 2013) titled "Quantisation as a guide to ontic structure". Abstract: The ontic structural realist stance is motivated by a desire to do philosophical justice to the success of science, whilst withstanding the metaphysical undermining generated by the various species of ontological underdetermination. We are, however, as yet in want of general principles to provide a scaffold for the explicit construction of structural ontologies. Here we will attempt to bridge this gap by utilising the formal procedure of quantisation as a guide to ontic structure of modern physical theory. The example of non-relativistic particle mechanics will be considered and, for that case, it will be argued that, modulo certain mathematical ambiguities, a consistent candidate structural ontology can be established.

Thomas Pashby (Pittsburgh) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (28 May, 2014) titled "Against Dogma: Locality, Conditionalisation, and Collapse in Relativistic Quantum Mechanics". Abstract: I argue here against the widespread view (due to David Malament) that the non-commutativity of non-instantaneous localisation projections implies the existence of act-outcome correlations in relativistic QM. There are two facets to my argument: first, I claim that the interpretation of collapse as a process brought about by the experimenter is mistaken; second, I contend that a fully relativistic model should not condition on the occurrence of spacelike separated instantaneous events. This leaves the door open to define a relativistically invariant (but non-commuting) system of localization, which I interpret in terms of conditional probabilities for the occurrence of events. In accord with Tumulka (2009), I conclude that non-local correlations of events in a relativistic quantum theory need not imply the sort of action at a distance that worries Malament (1996).

Detlef Dürr (LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (23 January, 2013) titled "Bohmian Mechanics, speakable quantum physics". Abstract: I introduce Bohmian Mechanics, which is a theory of particles in motion. The law of motion is not classical, i.e. the particles do not move on Newtonian trajectories. As this is often not appreciated I shall discuss some features which will help to sharpen one's intuition about this theory of nature.

Andreas Barrels (Bonn) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (7 May, 2014) titled "How to Bite the Bullet of Quidditism - Why a Standard Argument against Categoricalism in Physics Fails". Abstract: Categoricalism is the statement that fundamental properties of physics are categorical, i.e., they have their dispositional characters not with metaphysical necessity. According to Black (2000), Bird (2005, 2007), and Esfeld (2009), categoricalism entails quidditism, the possible existence of properties which are not exclusively individuated by their dispositional characters. If quidditism is true, we cannot know, in principle, whether it is property F or its “Doppelgänger” G that shows up by exhibiting a certain set of dispositional characters. Since we cannot accept our metaphysics of properties to condemn us to necessary ignorance of fundamental properties, we must reject quidditism. Therefore, categoricalism fails. I argue that the possible epistemic situation revealed by quidditism is a case of empirical underdetermination of theoretical properties. This type of situation is not conceived, in general, as the occurrence of some necessary limit of knowledge. There are rational procedures to deal with empirical underdetermination in physics, and thus to decide about the properties the existence of which we are committed to accept. Thus, the unacceptability claim against quidditism is not well founded and categoricalism cannot be defeated that way.