Stephan Hartmann is regarded as one of the leading scholars in the fields of formal epistemology and philosophy of science, and he became a member of the Faculty of Philosophy at LMU last October. Later today (8 May, 2013), at a ceremony in Berlin, Hartmann will officially receive Germany’s most generously endowed prize for distinguished contributions to research, the Alexander von Humboldt Professorship, that brought him back to the land of his birth. Hartmann now holds the Chair of Philosophy of Science at LMU‘s Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) and, together with his colleague Hannes Leitgeb, who occupies the Chair of Logic and Philosophy of Language and also holds a Humboldt Professorship, he is actively engaged in extending the interdisciplinary reach of his subject in often surprising directions. The basic goal of the MCMP is to apply advanced mathematical methods to a range of complex philosophical problems. Born in 1968, Hartmann studied Philosophy and Physics, and has held professorships at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and, prior to his move to LMU, at Tilburg University in the Netherlands, where he served as Founding Director of the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science. Hartmann is the fourth Humboldt Professor at LMU. The honor had previously been accorded to systems biologist Ulrike Gaul, astrophysicist Georgi Dvali and Hannes Leitgeb. The prestigious awards, administered by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and financed by the Federal Ministry for Research, are intended to enable internationally recognized scholars and scientists to carry out long-term, groundbreaking projects at research institutions and universities in Germany. (LMU press release, Munich, 8 May 2013)

The MCMP is proud to present over 250 videos on iTunes U! Thanks for all your contributions in the last two years! In 2013 we are introducting 4 new channels: "Logic", "Epistemology", "Philosophy of Science", "Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language". Have fun exploring!

Craig Callender (UCSD) gives a talk at the MCMP/MCTS Workshop on Laws of Nature (17 December, 2012) titled "Building a Better System". Abstract: In this talk I'll sketch the central motivating idea behind Humean approaches to lawhood, namely, that modality arises from bodies of knowledge, not the world (see, e.g., Putnam 1962). Keeping one's eyes firmly focused on this motivation is the key to developing so-called "system" approaches to lawhood. I'll claim that it will suggest particular ways of formulating the best system theory and also replies to recent criticisms. But it will also invite many open questions, such as why do creatures like us modalize at all?

Markus Schrenk (Köln) gives a talk at the MCMP/MCTS Workshop on Laws of Nature (17 December, 2012) titled "Trouble with Properties for Better Best Systems". Abstract: In Lewis' original best system account, the mosaic of point-sized, intrinsic, quiddistic, perfectly natural, fundamental properties is the ultimate material on which everything else, laws of nature in particular, supervenes. While better best system competitions (BBSCs) for different, separate special science property sets aim to apply the same mechanism as Lewis's to get the laws from the distributions of properties (balancing simplicity, strength and fit) it is not so clear: (i) which features properties of the special science have (they are clearly not fundamental, maybe not natural but also not-quiddistic, etc.), (ii) in which kind of entities they are instantiated (clearly not singular space-time points), (iii) how BBSCs deal with vague and extensionless properties, (iv) and what the boundaries are for the different sets of properties which BBSCs take as raw material for allegedly separate competitions. This paper will show that (i) - (iv) are not easy to answer for (us) better best system advocates.

Michael Esfeld (Lausanne) gives a talk at the MCMP/MCTS Workshop on Laws of Nature (17 December, 2012) titled "Humeanism and dispositionalism in physics". Abstract: The paper sets out to make a case for a natural philosophy or naturalized metaphysics that treats physics and metaphysics as inseparable. It examines how Humeanism and dispositionalism about laws of nature fare with respect to classical as well as quantum physics. In particular, I argue that, despite widespread claims to the contrary, Lewis' metaphysics of Humean supervenience is applicable to non-relativistic quantum mechanics and that its application even removes the charge of quidditism. However, this position faces considerable difficulties once physics abandons the assumption of a background system of geometrical relations unifying the world. Against this background, I indicate reasons to prefer dispositionalism to Humeanism.

Helen Beebee (Manchester) gives a talk at the MCMP/MCTS Workshop on Laws of Nature (17 December, 2012) titled "Ramsey vs. Lewis on conditionals and causation". Abstract: In this paper, I explore the prospects for a (very roughly sketched) broadly Pricean perspectivalist account of causation. The ingredient I add to the mix is the thought, familiar from Lewis and others, that causal claims express conditional relationships – except that here the relevant conditional is to be understood in Ramseyan, non-truth-apt terms rather than in terms of Lewis’s machinery of possible worlds. I argue that this approach is much better able than the standard counterfactual approach to account for the close connection between causation and inference.

Mathias Frisch (Maryland) gives a talk at the MCMP/MCTS Workshop on Laws of Nature (17 December, 2012) titled "Why Physics Can't Explain Everything". Abstract: Barry Loewer and David Albert have argued for a view on laws that is at once pragmatic (and takes nomic regularities are summaries of aspects of the Humean mosaic that are useful for beings like us) and 'imperialistic' or foundationalist. I argue in this paper that there is a deep tension between the two planks of the account and suggest that it is the pragmatism and not the foundationalism that is worth keeping.

Stathis Psillos (Athens) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (13 December, 2012) titled "Making Contact with Molecules: On Perrin's Argument for Realism". Abstract: Between roughly 1908 and 1912, there was a turn in the scientific community in favour of the atomic hypothesis. Jean Perrin’s theoretical and experimental work on the causes of Brownian motion played a major role in this shift. When Perrin received the Nobel Prize for physics in 1926, it was noted in the presentation speech that he “put a definite end to the long struggle regarding the real existence of molecules”. The aim of this talk is to cast light on the reasons that explain the shift of opinion concerning the reality of atoms and molecules in the beginning of the twentieth century. The story told will have some rather interesting repercussions concerning the scientific realism debate. After presenting the philosophical debate concerning the role and status of explanatory hypotheses c.1900, (focusing on the work of Ostwald, Poincaré and Boltzmann), I will examine in detail Perrin’s theoretical account of the molecular origins of Brownian motion and explain the structure and the strength of Perrin’s argument for the reality of molecules.

Peter Adamson (LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (22 November, 2012) titled "Logic as an Instrument in Greek and Arabic Philosophy". Abstract: As is well known, the Aristotelian works on logic were collectively referred to in antiquity as the Organon, meaning "instrument". Ancient Aristotelians took this seriously: for them, logic is not a part of philosophy but only a tool or instrument which one should ideally learn before embarking on the study of philosopher proper. This view was not universally adopted in antiquity, however. The Stoics made logic one of three broad areas of philosophy (along with ethics and physics), and thought of these areas as closely interrelated "parts". In this paper I explore the philosophical consequences of this apparently rather superficial disagreement; for instance, it bears on the question of the extent to which logic was perceived in the ancient world as a "formal" discipline. I also pursue the part vs. instrument debate into the Arabic tradition. There, we find adherents of Aristotle torn between their desire to agree that logic is a mere instrument, and not a part, of philosophy, and their desire to show the importance of logic against its detractors.

Giovanni Valente (Pittsburgh) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (06 December, 2012) titled "Local Disentanglement in Relativistic Quantum Field Theory". Abstract: In their paper on "Entanglement and Open Systems in Algebraic Quantum Field Theory", Clifton and Halvorson (2001) raised the question whether entanglement between quantum systems can be destroyed by means of local operations and claimed that, contrary to non-relativistic quantum mechanics, this can never be the case in relativistic quantum field theory. In this talk I will argue that Clifton and Halvorson's no-go result applies only to a special kind of local operations, and thereby I will reject their conclusion. In fact, after providing sufficient conditions for local disentanglement to be achieved, I will show that, if the split property holds, there exists a class of local operations which disentangle all states across any pair of spacelike separated quantum field systems.