Featured Speakers: Dr. Dania Thafer, Shaikh Nawaf bin Mubarak Al Thani, Bilal Saab, and Ambassador Patrick Theros (moderator). Synopsis: Ever since the promulgation of President Jimmy Carter’s namesake “Carter Doctrine” in 1980, declaring that any threat to the free flow of commerce in the Gulf would be regarded as a threat to the United States, America has served as the Gulf’s primary security guarantor. American hegemony in the Gulf led the United States to protect the Strait of Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq War, force Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait in 1991, and topple the Iraqi dictator twelve years later. However, over the past two decades, America’s military deployments in the Gulf have come under greater scrutiny at home, and successive U.S. administrations have grown increasingly reluctant to participate in regional conflicts. While former president Trump sought to reassure America’s Gulf allies that the United States would continue to support them, he also pushed for the United States to draw down its regional military footprint, and President Biden has shown similar instincts, declining to support Saudi Arabia during its military intervention in Yemen and seeking to return to a nuclear agreement with Iran. Uncertainty over America’s future role in the Gulf has led its traditional partners in the region to seek alternative foreign patrons and address their own security needs. As Washington has wavered, the GCC states have pursued closer ties with Russia and China, America’s two great-power competitors, and have also sought to resolve their disagreements with the Islamic Republic. These new developments have forced the United States to seriously rethink its own strategy in the region. America is not a “Gulf state,” but it is directly affected by the events in it—much as it was under President Carter. What does the future hold for America and the Gulf? In what ways has America telegraphed uncertainty in its Gulf policy? How can Washington address Gulf states’ concerns in this regard? How have other world powers reacted? And must the “Carter Doctrine” always be enforced, or could it ever be made irrelevant by a new understanding of regional security?  

Featured speakers: Sinem Cengiz, Dr. Abdullah Baabood, Dr. Tarek Cherkaoui, Dr. Betul Dogan-Akkas, Dr. Murat Yesiltas. Synopsis: In mid-July, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ended his three-day tour of the Gulf. While his visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates were primarily economic in nature—the Turkish leader secured a series of investment agreements intended to restore his country’s economy and control inflation—signs of warmer political ties between Ankara and the GCC were also noticeable. Erdogan’s tour marked the most recent attempt to turn the page on the tensions that shadowed GCC-Turkish relations until 2021, largely as a consequence of geopolitical rivalry and Turkey’s support for Qatar during the 2017-2021 GCC crisis. Over the last two years, and for reasons related to location and energy exports, both Turkey and the GCC states have gained influence in global affairs, due in large part to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the intensifying great power competition. The increasing importance of Turkish defense exports and capabilities—and their demonstrated battlefield effectiveness in Ukraine—were a factor that helped Ankara, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh to put their differences aside. During Erdogan’s visit, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement to purchase Turkish Bayraktar drones and other military equipment, providing Turkey with a much-needed financial lifeline to wealthy customers in the Gulf. What issues brought the GCC states and Turkey closer? How have recent elections in Turkey affected Ankara’s broader relationship with the Gulf? How has the war on Ukraine impacted the two sides? In what ways has the recent Iranian-Saudi rapprochement played a role in a closer GCC-Turkish relations?

Featured speakers: Anas Alqaed, Dr. Khalid Mustafa Medani, Niemat Ahmadi, Mohamed Abu Bakr, and Umer Karim. Synopsis: Two months ago, violence broke out across Sudan between the country’s armed forces, led by General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary “Rapid Support Forces” (RSF) led by Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo. Although the conflict began in Khartoum as a struggle for control over government buildings and military bases, it has since spread across the country, leading to a dramatic escalation of violence and thousands of civilian deaths. According to the United Nations, 500,000 Sudanese have fled the country and 1.6 million have been internally displaced. In the last three weeks, the conflict in Darfur—a region still healing from the horrific campaign of ethnic cleansing by the “Janjaweed” militia, the RSF’s predecessor organization—has intensified, with the kidnapping and murder of a provincial governor, attacks on civilians, sexual violence against women and girls, and the renewed specter of crimes against humanity. To de-escalate the conflict, the international community has arranged peace talks in Jeddah, where representatives from both the SAF and the RSF have met for negotiations. These negotiations have been widely supported in the international community and have featured mediation from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Israel, Ethiopia, South Sudan, the United States, the European Union, the African Union, the United Nations, and other international organizations and regional stakeholders. However, these talks have made limited to no progress, due in part to the conflicting interests of the peacemakers within the country. The Gulf states in particular have sought to increase their influence in Khartoum since the overthrow of longtime Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir, while the rivalry between Burhan and Hemedti has given Russia, Israel, Egypt, and the GCC a reason for greater involvement in Sudan’s affairs. How can the Gulf states constructively contribute to the end of the crisis in Sudan? What responsibility, if any, do the GCC states hold for the conflict? Why have the Jeddah talks failed to bring about a lasting ceasefire? What is the role of regional and international powers outside the Gulf in supporting the different groups? How do Russian, Israeli, Egyptian, and American interests intersect with interests of the Gulf states?

Featured Speakers: Ambassador Patrick Theros, Ambassador Gerald Feierstein, Summer Nasser, Dr. Nabeel Khoury. Synopsis: One month after the eighth anniversary of the Saudi-led Arab coalition’s military intervention in Yemen, the first solid step toward peace between Riyadh and the Houthis took place in Sana’a, when the Saudi ambassador to Yemen met with leaders from the northern rebel movement. That meeting, mediated by Oman, was followed by statements from all sides stressing the need for a political resolution to the Yemen conflict and an end to violence. The meeting came at a time of general de-escalation and rapprochement across the Middle East; last year, Yemen witnessed the first lasting truce between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, a significant exchange of prisoners, and several rounds of productive negotiations. Indeed, the progress in peace talks has alleviated some concerns of both sides and given civilians a crucial break from hostilities, enabling humanitarian work to proceed across the country. In spite of these encouraging trends, however, low-level clashes between pro-government forces and the Houthis have continued in Marib and other disputed areas. The motives for de-escalation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have played a clear role in the negotiations process fostered by Oman and the UN. Neither Riyadh nor Sana’a regarded the prolonging of the war with no clear winner as a desirable outcome. In order to proceed with its ambitious economic plans, Riyadh needs stability in the region and an end to the security threats along its southern border. In turn, the Houthis have sought international recognition for their rule and economic growth to legitimize their government. The greatest victor in a peace agreement will be the Yemeni people themselves, who have quietly suffered the war’s worst consequences since its onset. What are possible concessions for each side to initiate the peace process? How can a Saudi-Houthi agreement pave the way for a Yemeni-Yemeni agreement? How can Yemeni women and civil society organizations be part of any agreement? What are the priorities for any agreement to preserve the country’s unity and prevent future infighting?

Featured speakers: Professor David Des Roches and Dr. David B. Roberts. About the Book: The Gulf monarchies—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates—play crucial roles in world markets and politics. Their economies, which have traditionally been driven by oil revenues, have simultaneously propelled transformative change and preserved the traditional order. Fossil fuel wealth has underwritten an implicit social contract characterized by generous welfare states, ruler-centric politics, and a heavy state presence in the economy, facilitating stability during tumultuous times. However, as the transition toward renewable energy looms, will the Gulf monarchies be able to adapt? David B. Roberts offers a definitive guide to continuity and change in the Gulf region. He explores the forces challenging and bolstering the status quo across the political, social, economic, military, and environmental dimensions of security. Roberts examines the six monarchies individually and holistically, considering their recent histories and contemporary concerns. Beneath wide-ranging changes affecting these countries, he pinpoints key dynamics and structures that have persisted over the long term. The book examines key topics such as generational change in leadership, migrant workers, female labor force participation, U.S. military influence, and the multifaceted threat of climate change. Roberts scrutinizes how a move away from the oil-centered economic model could reverberate across the social spectrum, with profound implications for security. Suitable for a range of courses and offering important new insights for experts, this book is an accessible and up-to-date overview of the politics of a key world region.

Featured Speakers: Dr. Dania Thafer, Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Dr. Banafsheh Keynoush, and Dr. Kenneth Katzman. Synopsis: On March 10, 2023, the world was stunned by the announcement that the Gulf’s greatest rivals, Iran and Saudi Arabia, would restore diplomatic ties. Concluded in China after two years of negotiations in Iraq and Oman, the agreement was penned by the Iranian and Saudi National Security Advisors in the presence of the Chinese Foreign Minister. The accord commits both parties to resume diplomatic relations in two months, to respect the principles of non-interference and the sovereignty of states in the region, and to revive the 2001 security agreement that once improved ties between Tehran and Riyadh. The world witnessed several rounds of talks since the first meeting between the two states in April 2021, but it was the concluding session in China this month that paved the way for a meeting of Iran and Saudi Arabia’s foreign ministers and the ultimate announcement that the two countries would end the diplomatic deadlock of the past seven years. The March 10 statement gave observers few insights into the mechanisms that will resolve the two sides’ several outstanding disputes, however. Little information begets significant speculation, and it remains to be seen if the agreement will change the relationship of the Gulf’s most powerful rivals—or the regional roles of external great powers—in the years to come. How could the Gulf states leverage this agreement to end the war in Yemen? What factors motivated Iran and Saudi Arabia to sign the deal now? What were China’s interests in persuading both sides to reestablish diplomatic contact and pursue rapprochement? How will the United States’ role in the Gulf or America’s relationship with Riyadh be affected by China’s entry as a meditator in the region? Will this agreement limit the activities of the IRGC and proxy forces throughout the region? Will the IRGC commit to any de-escalation or security coordination agreements signed between Riyadh and the Raisi government? In the wider region, will conflict resolution efforts in Syria and Lebanon also benefit from the recent agreement? Is this agreement durable, or will it collapse?

Featured Speakers: Dr. Mark N. Katz and Dr. Diana Galeeva. Book Description In recent decades Russia has played an increasingly active role in the Middle East as states within the region continue to diversify their relations with major external powers. Yet the role of specific Russian regions, especially those that share an ‘Islamic identity’ with the GCC has been overlooked. In this book Diana Galeeva examines the relations between the Gulf States and Russia from the Soviet era to the present day. Using the Republic of Tatarstan, one of Russia’s Muslim polities as a case study, Galeeva demonstrates the emergence of relations between modern Tatarstan and the GCC States, evolving from concerns with economic survival to a rising paradiplomacy reliant on shared Islamic identities. Having conducted fieldwork in the Muslim Republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Dagestan, the book includes interviews with high-ranking political figures, heads of religious organisations and academics. Moving beyond solely economic and geopolitical considerations, the research in this book sheds light on the increasingly important role that culture and shared Islamic identity play in paradiplomacy efforts.

Featured Speakers: Dr. Dania Thafer, Dr. Cinzia Bianco, Dr. Samuel Ramani, and Eugene Chausovsky. Synopsis: As the Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches its first anniversary, the Gulf states have played a variety of roles in the conflict, both directly and peripherally. By providing drones and missiles to the Russian military, Iran has established itself as the Gulf’s most direct participant in the conflict, and the only country in the region whose leadership has openly sided with the Kremlin. By contrast, all six of the GCC states immediately voted to condemn the invasion at the United Nations General Assembly, and most have provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine over the past year. However, the GCC’s approaches to the conflict have varied by nation; while Kuwait and Qatar have vocally condemned Russia, the other four members of the bloc have preserved relatively cordial ties with Moscow, with the United Arab Emirates in particular emerging as an outlet for Russian finance. Much of the Gulf has continued to cooperate with Russia under the OPEC+ oil alliance, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE have worked to organize prisoner exchanges between the two sides, buying them goodwill in both Moscow and Kyiv and strengthening their soft-power credentials. Constrained by geopolitical considerations, the Western nations have adopted a nuanced approach toward the Gulf throughout the conflict. In the days following the invasion in February 2022, the United States and the European Union strongly pressured the six GCC states to condemn Russia at the General Assembly. After they did so, the West largely refrained from heavy-handed pressure on the Gulf to comply with sanctions on Moscow. Concurrently, Europe sought to increase its imports of oil and natural gas from the Gulf in order to offset sanctioned Russian hydrocarbons. However, after the OPEC+ decision in late 2022 to cut oil production in order to preserve high prices, a number of Western officials vocally condemned what they perceived as financial opportunism within the GCC states. In the second year of the war, with both the military outcome and its global financial impacts uncertain, the Gulf’s importance in the conflict will only grow. What factors motivate the Gulf states’ stances on the ongoing war? Why have some GCC nations condemned Russia and supported Ukraine more explicitly than others? How have the GCC states’ relations with Russia changed over the last year? Can Saudi Arabia and the UAE preserve their cordial relations with Moscow if hostilities escalate? How can the West (and Russia) encourage the Gulf nations to adopt a Ukraine policy closer to their interests?

Featured speakers: Ambassador Patrick Theros, Alia Moubayed, Dr. David Pollock, and Dr. Jean-Loup Samaan. Synopsis: As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its second year, the conflict has decisively shaped political and economic issues in the Gulf. The rapid increase in oil and gas prices in the aftermath of the invasion has come as a boon to the GCC states, giving some of them a sizable budget surplus for the first time in years and easing pressures for economic reform. High oil and gas prices have also increased the Gulf’s strategic importance, giving its governments greater stature in international affairs. Both the United States and China have taken high-profile visits to the Gulf in the past year, encouraging GCC leaders to lower oil prices and increase strategic partnership. Each of the GCC capitals, and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in particular, have used their newfound status to seek concessions from the two superpowers, playing them off against each other for their own interests. At the same time, Iranian assistance to Russia during the conflict—providing the Kremlin with Iranian-made missiles and drones—has dashed early hopes that the United States and Europe would attempt to renegotiate the JCPOA in order to allow Iranian oil to flow once more. Instead, Tehran’s crackdown on its ongoing protest movement has made the agreement politically untenable in the West. Negotiations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have also failed to make progress in resolving the two rivals’ longstanding disputes, although further negotiations are planned for the coming year. What does 2023 hold for the Gulf? Will the region’s windfall from high hydrocarbon prices decrease the odds of successful economic diversification? What role will the United States and China play in the region? Will Iran’s political crisis make it less likely to engage in regional adventurism, or will it seek to fight foreign enemies to distract from its problems at home? At a time of relative prosperity, could intra-GCC tensions flare up once again?

Featured Speakers: Professor David Des Roches (moderator), Dr. Diana Galeeva, Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Professor Simon Chadwick, and Dr. Paul Michael Brannagan. Synopsis: The six Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have each affirmed the use of “soft power” as an essential part of their overarching national strategies. Soft power, as outlined by American international relations scholar Joseph Nye, refers to the use of diplomatic and cultural tools in order to promote a country’s image abroad and improve its international relationships—usually contrasted with “hard power,” or the pursuit of foreign objectives via direct coercion and military force. Each of the six Gulf states has sought to bolster their international reputations through soft power: each has pursued regional and international mediation efforts, made substantial investments in sports—perhaps best exemplified by Saudi Arabia’s LIV golf tournament and Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup—and highlighted domestic art and cultural programs. This strategy has clearly had positive impacts for the GCC states’ international relations and their perceptions around the world. However, the use of soft power has also come with controversy. International human rights organizations have accused the six GCC states of using achievement in diplomacy, culture and sports to cover up domestic struggles with political freedoms and labor rights. In particular, the six states’ ambitious sports programs have led to accusations of “sportswashing,” or promoting sports development as a way of distracting from human rights concerns. What is the status of soft power in the six GCC states? Has it been an effective tool of statecraft? What benefits are associated with the use of soft power? Have there been any drawbacks to its use?