China | A hawkish turn Public opinion in China is hardening on America and Taiwan A rare poll shows the views of ordinary Chinese are changing Mar 19th 2026|3 min read CHINA IS having a moment in Western public opinion. Communist Party mouthpieces crow that the country is increasingly “cool”. Young Westerners on social media are “Chinamaxxing”: adopting Chinese habits like drinking hot water (not cold), or Tsingtao beer. Polls suggest that views of China, especially among the young, are growing more favourable. A report released on March 9th suggests the feeling is not mutual. Chinese opinion polls rarely ask about sensitive issues. But unusually, across three surveys in 2024-25, the Carter Centre, an American think-tank, was able to ask 6,500 Chinese people for their views on international affairs. The results suggest that China’s population sees the world in increasingly stark terms. Fewer Chinese now oppose using military force to unify China and Taiwan. President Donald Trump’s aggressive foreign policy appears to have dented views of America and stiffened Chinese resolve. The survey also shows that opinion diverges from state narratives in some key areas. Two years ago more than half of Chinese opposed unifying China and Taiwan by military force. By late 2025, that figure had fallen to 38% (see chart one). Support for forced unification, under at least some circumstances, had risen from 25% in 2024 to almost half. Importantly, of all their neighbours, Chinese feel most warmly about Taiwan—in line with state narratives that the Taiwanese are “family”. A minority see Taiwan’s computer-chip business as an important reason for unification. A series of events last year, including a big arms deal struck by America and Taiwan and comments by the Japanese prime minister, probably contributed to the rising hawkishness, bolstering President Xi Jinping’s stance. Mr Xi can also count on support for his tit-for-tat approach to relations with Mr Trump. Almost three-quarters of respondents regarded America as a national-security threat. Some 62% of people backed retaliation against America’s trade war, for instance by cutting off rare-earths exports, even if it is costly to China. Only 4% supported negotiating over export controls on chips. In 2024 views on America were more evenly split. In the past, the public saw amity with America as vital to China’s economic success. Now, however, they “are demanding a relationship of equals”, says Nick Zeller, one of the survey’s authors. Public opinion in China is remarkably unified, thanks in part to the consistency of the state narratives that help shape it. But one characteristic appears to predict a respondent’s views better than others: income. High earners tend to view America, including its culture, more favourably than does the population at large, the poll suggests (see chart two). But the well-off are also more strident about Chinese power: they think more highly of Russia, and are more open to a military solution to Taiwan. The government has previously suppressed polling that showed that the rich had views out of step with the rest of the country. Still, the population appears to be at odds with the dominant state narratives on some issues, notes Yawei Liu, another survey author. Despite support for trade with Russia, some 44% of Chinese oppose sending troops to support its war in Ukraine, a limit on the countries’ “no-limits partnership”. China calls its territorial claims in the South China Sea “indisputable”, but almost half the population would support giving up some claims in return for America reducing its security presence in Asia. And contrary to state-media love-ins, the population has a remarkably low opinion of Cambodia, a diplomatic pal, thanks to its rampant scam industry. Popular support at home can be useful to the government when it wants to signal its resolve abroad. But opinion in China tends to be elastic and responsive to state narratives. That is partly because the state can be persuasive, and partly because survey respondents know what the government wants to hear. ■ 中國民意在美國與台灣議題上正在轉趨強硬 一項罕見的民意調查顯示，普通中國民眾的觀點正在改變 2026年3月19日 | 3分鐘閱讀時間 第一段：西方對中的觀感 中國正處於西方公眾輿論中的一個高光時刻。 共產黨的喉舌媒體吹噓該國正變得越來越「酷」。 社交媒體上的西方年輕人正在進行「極致中國化」：採納中國習慣，例如喝熱水（而非冷水），或喝青島啤酒。 民意調查顯示，對中國的看法，特別是在年輕人中，正變得越來越正向。 第二段：卡特中心的調查結果 3月9日發布的一份報告顯示，這種感覺並非相互的（雙向的）。 中國的民意調查鮮少詢問敏感議題。 但不同尋常的是，在2024至2025年間的三項調查中，美國智庫「卡特中心」得以詢問6,500名中國人對國際事務的看法。 結果顯示，中國人口正以日益極端（非黑即白）的角度看待世界。 現在反對使用武力統一中國與台灣的中國人變少了。 唐納·川普總統激進的外交政策似乎削弱了對美國的看法，並強化了中國的決心。 調查還顯示，在某些關鍵領域，民意與國家論述存在分歧。 第三段：台灣議題與武力統一 兩年前，超過一半的中國人反對以武力統一中國與台灣。 到2025年末，該數據已下降至38%（見圖表一）。 對強制統一的支持（至少在某些情況下）已從2024年的25%上升到近一半。 重要的是，在所有鄰居中，中國人對台灣感覺最溫暖——這與國家敘事中台灣人是「一家人」的說法一致。 少數人將台灣的電腦晶片產業視為統一的重要原因。 去年發生的一系列事件，包括美台達成的大型軍售協議以及日本首相的言論，可能促使了鷹派情緒的上升，支持了習近平主席的立場。 第四段：對美關係與反制措施 習近平也可以指望民眾支持他對川普關係採取的「以牙還牙」方針。 近四分之三的受訪者將美國視為國家安全威脅。 約62%的人支持對美國貿易戰進行報復，例如通過切斷稀土出口，即便這對中國代價高昂。 僅有4%的人支持就晶片出口管制進行談判。 在2024年，對美國的觀點分布較為均衡。 過去，大眾將與美國的友好視為中國經濟成功的關鍵。 然而現在，調查作者之一尼克·澤勒表示，他們「正要求一種平等的關係」。 第五段：收入對觀點的影響 中國的民意顯著統一，部分歸功於塑造民意的國家敘事的一致性。 但有一種特徵似乎比其他特徵更能預測受訪者的觀點：收入。 民調顯示，高收入者往往比大眾人口對美國（包括其文化）持有更多好感（見圖表二）。 但富裕階層對中國力量也更加強硬：他們對俄羅斯的評價更高，且對台灣問題的軍事解決方案抱持更開放的態度。 政府此前曾壓制顯示富人觀點與國家其他地區不一致的民調。 第六段：與國家論述的分歧 儘管如此，另一位調查作者劉亞偉指出，在某些問題上，民眾似乎與主導性的國家論述不一致。 儘管支持與俄羅斯的貿易，約44%的中國人反對派遣軍隊支持其在烏克蘭的戰爭，這是兩國「無上限夥伴關係」的一個限制。 中國稱其在南海的領土主張是「無可爭辯的」，但近一半的人口會支持放棄部分主張，以換取美國減少在亞洲的安全存在。 與官方媒體的熱情宣傳相反，由於柬埔寨猖獗的詐騙產業，民眾對這個外交盟友的評價明顯很低。 第七段：結論 當政府想要對外展現決心時，國內的民眾支持可能很有用。 但中國的民意往往具有彈性，且會對國家論述做出反應。 這部分是因為國家具有說服力，部分是因為調查受訪者知道政府想聽什麼。 --Hosting provided by SoundOn