Obituary | God’s dictator falls Ali Khamenei hoped his legacy might last for ever Iran’s Supreme Leader was killed on February 28th, aged 86 Mar 3rd 2026|5 min read Across the decades, Ali Khamenei built up countless reasons for his hatred of the West. They began with a fiery speech he heard at 13, when at school, inveighing against the monarchy that was backed by America and its allies. As a young man he was jailed six times, beaten and tortured by the Shah’s secret police. When the Shah fell in 1979, and the hotheads in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s new Islamic Republic took American** diplomats** hostage, it was plain that America would seek to undermine Iran by any means. In the Iran-Iraq war of 1980 America even supported Iraq, ruled by a tyrant, rather than Iran. A decade later, when Ali Khamenei became Supreme Leader himself, attitudes had hardened on both sides. Increasingly, over the next 30 years, he knew he was personally in the Great Satan’s sights. This did not daunt him. Martyrdom would be sweet; in many ways, he had already courted it. Like Khomeini, his long-term mentor and friend, he had divine right on his side. America led a phalanx of countries that were morally corrupt; but Islam made Iran strong, pure and spiritually protected. It disgusted him to have to deal or negotiate with the West, even through officials. He came to disdain foreign investment, in case it increased “Westoxification” in Iran; during the pandemic he refused to import Western vaccines, because they might bring the virus in. Only “heroic flexibility”** induced him to** agree to the nuclear deal with America in 2015. Then, predictably, Donald Trump tore it up and tried, with Israel (the Little Satan) to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities into oblivion. Why trust such people? Why negotiate, when America’s sole purpose was to ensure that Iran had no nuclear power at all? No free nation would behave that way. Besides, when Mr Trump’s body was ashes, eaten by worms and ants, the robust tree of the Islamic Republic would still be standing. His position as Supreme Leader seemed unassailable, but it had never been his ambition. He was a literary boy, and the books he most enjoyed—“Uncle Tom’s Cabin”, “The Grapes of Wrath” and, especially, Victor Hugo’s “Les Misérables”—were about the struggles of the poor. Growing up as he did, with many siblings in a single room and a damp basement, sometimes subsisting on bread and raisins, he knew that story. He enjoyed music, too, and his mother quoted the poet Hafiz to him. But he was in Mashhad, a sacred city; his father was a religious scholar; so from four years old he was immersed in Islamic studies, eventually in Qom. They went slowly. By the 1980s he was still a hujjat al-islam, equivalent to a middle-ranking Christian priest. As he was appointed to higher and higher posts—first, by Khomeini, to the presidency, then by Khomeini’s allies to the ultimate position—he did not feel it was his proper place. He, after all, had been the mild cleric sent to wish the American hostages Happy Christmas. But when he was made an ayatollah almost at once, and the constitution amended to overlook his lack of learning, he settled into the role as if born to it. It was as a supreme jurist, wearing the black cap of a direct descendant of Muhammad, that he gazed benignly from billboards and posters across the country. And it was as a great teacher that he preached and wrote books on forgiveness, patience and “101 tips for a happy marriage”, telling Iranians how to live. In short he was everywhere, ruling now by divine authority. His tongue could channel God. Also, though many had underrated him, he knew how to build up worldly power. He proved adept at playing Iran’s state institutions off against each other—the presidency against parliament and the army against the regime’s most powerful security force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose activities he encouraged. This made him the final arbiter. Besides, whereas Iran’s often-more-moderate presidents had a limit of two consecutive terms, he was appointed for life. Beneath him, too, he had the Guardian Council, a quango of clerics and lawyers that vetted electoral candidates and, increasingly, disqualified or drove out all but his favourites. Rival ayatollahs and their acolytes were co-opted with government money and jobs. Meanwhile his office vastly expanded, with commissars in all government departments, provinces and military units. A force of over 1m paramilitaries enforced ideological discipline at home. Meanwhile an “axis of resistance”—Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen—carried it abroad. His business empire was also extraordinary. He might live frugally, receiving visitors in a bare room with one sofa and a few wooden chairs, but he controlled assets worth tens of billions of dollars. Soon after his succession he took over the Shia charities from the government and turned them into vast conglomerates that hoovered up state contracts. He also seized the properties the Shah’s men had abandoned when they fled from the Islamic revolution. The humble cleric from Mashhad had inherited the Earth. Yet many of his subjects grew to loathe and rise against him. Their troubles were economic, obviously the result of American sanctions, though they added those familiar, tiresome Western tropes of freedom, human rights, dress codes for women. Clearly, foreign enemies had fomented this. So he responded by beating, jailing and shooting, eventually ordering the killing of thousands. An attack by dissident revolutionaries in 1981, which paralysed his right arm, had taught him never to concede. As he said then, he did not need his arm, as long as his brain and tongue worked. He hoped to leave a legacy. This was not necessarily a dynasty, though he had four sons, all of them clerics. He was thinking more of his “Second Step” of the Islamic revolution, more pious and more energetic. Evidently, his own time was limited. He would be bundled away for safety if or when Iran’s enemies struck. How much more honourable, more deserving of the paradise to come, to drink the pure draught of a martyr’s end. ■ 訃聞】上帝的獨裁者倒下：哈米尼曾期望其豐功偉業永存 伊朗最高領袖於 2026 年 2 月 28 日遇刺身亡，享壽 86 歲。 2026 年 3 月 3 日 | 5 分鐘閱讀 數十年來，阿里·哈米尼（Ali Khamenei）累積了無數痛恨西方的理由。這一切始於他 13 歲在學校聽的一場慷慨激昂的演說，內容抨擊受美國及其盟友支持的君主政權。年輕時，他曾六度入獄，並遭受沙阿（Shah）秘密警察的毆打與酷刑。1979 年沙阿政權垮台，何梅尼（Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini）領導的新伊斯蘭共和國激進分子挾持了美國外交官作為人質，當時情勢已很明朗：美國將不擇手段削弱伊朗。在 1980 年的兩伊戰爭中，美國甚至支持由暴君統治的伊拉克而非伊朗。十年後，當哈米尼親自接任最高領袖時，雙方的立場皆已硬化。在接下來的 30 年裡，他深知自己已被「大撒旦」（美國）盯上。 這並未令他畏縮。殉道對他而言是甘甜的；在許多方面，他甚至早已在追求這一點。正如他的長期導師兼好友何梅尼一樣，他認為神權站在他這一邊。美國領導的是一群道德腐敗的國家；而伊斯蘭則讓伊朗強大、純潔並受到精神保護。對他而言，即便透過官員與西方交涉或談判都令人厭惡。他開始鄙視外國投資，唯恐這會增加伊朗的「西化」現象；在疫情期間，他甚至拒絕進口西方疫苗，認為那可能帶來病毒。 只有「英勇的靈活性」才讓他勉強同意 2015 年與美國達成的核協議。果不其然，唐納·川普（Donald Trump）隨後撕毀了協議，並試圖與「小撒旦」（以色列）一起將伊朗的核設施炸成平地。為何要信任這種人？當美國唯一的目的是確保伊朗完全沒有核能時，還有什麼好談判的？沒有一個自由的民族會接受這樣的對待。此外，他堅信當川普的軀體化為灰燼、被蟲蟻啃食時，伊斯蘭共和國這棵茁壯的大樹依然會屹立不倒。 身為最高領袖，他的地位看似堅不可摧，但這從非他的志向。他曾是個熱愛文學的少年，最喜歡的書籍如《黑奴籲天錄》、《憤怒的葡萄》，尤其是維克多·雨果的《悲慘世界》，皆與窮人的鬥爭有關。他成長於一個多名手足擠在一間房與潮濕地下室的家庭，有時僅靠麵包與葡萄乾維生，他對這種故事並不陌生。他也熱愛音樂，母親常向他引用詩人哈菲茲的詩句。但他身處聖城馬什哈德（Mashhad），父親又是宗教學者；因此他從四歲起就沉浸在伊斯蘭研究中，最終進入庫姆（Qom）深造。 他的晉升之路緩慢。直到 1980 年代，他仍只是一位「霍賈特·伊斯蘭」（hujjat al-islam），相當於基督教中階神職人員。當他被指派到越來越高的職位時——先是被何梅尼任命為總統，隨後由何梅尼的盟友推舉至最高職位——他並不覺得那是他該待的地方。畢竟，他曾是那個被派去向美國人質祝賀聖誕快樂的溫和教士。然而，當他幾乎立刻被擢升為大阿亞圖拉，且憲法為了忽略他學術素養的不足而進行修改後，他便適應了這個角色，彷彿天生如此。他作為最高法學家，戴著代表穆罕默德直系後裔的黑色頭巾，慈祥地從全國各地的看板與海報上俯視眾生。他以偉大導師的身份，宣講並撰寫關於寬恕、耐心以及「幸福婚姻的 101 個秘訣」等書籍，教導伊朗人如何生活。簡而言之，他無處不在，如今憑藉神授權威實施統治，他的舌頭可以傳達上帝的旨意。 此外，雖然許多人低估了他，但他深諳建立世俗權力之道。他證明了自己善於玩弄權術，讓伊朗國家機構互相制衡——讓總統對抗議會，讓軍隊對抗政權最強大的安全力量「伊斯蘭革命衛隊」（IRGC），並鼓勵後者的活動。這使他成為最終的裁決者。此外，儘管伊朗那些溫和派總統有兩屆任期的限制，他卻是終身任職。 在他之下，還有憲法監護委員會，這是一個由教士和律師組成的官方機構，負責審查候選人，並日益排擠或取消除他心腹之外所有人的資格。競爭對手的阿亞圖拉及其追隨者則透過政府資金和職位被收編。與此同時，他的辦公室極度擴張，在所有政府部門、省份和軍事單位都派駐了監軍。一支超過 100 萬人的準軍事力量在國內執行意識形態紀律，而「抵抗之弧」——黎巴嫩真主黨、加薩哈瑪斯、葉門胡塞武裝——則將其影響力延伸至海外。 他的商業帝國同樣驚人。他或許生活簡樸，在只有一張沙發和幾張木椅的空曠房間接待訪客，但他控制著價值數百億美元的資產。繼位後不久，他從政府手中接管了什葉派慈善機構，將其轉變為巨大的企業集團，壟斷國家合同。他還沒收了沙阿親信在革命逃亡時遺留的財產。這位來自馬什哈德的謙卑教士，繼承了整個土地。 然而，他的許多臣民卻越來越憎恨他，並起身反抗。他們的困境顯然是美國制裁導致的經濟問題，儘管他們也加入了那些陳腐、令人厭煩的西方說辭，如自由、人權、女性著裝限制等。他認為這顯然是外國敵人的煽動。因此，他以毆打、入獄和槍擊作為回應，最終下令處死數千人。1981 年一場導致他右臂癱瘓的異議革命者襲擊，教會了他絕不讓步。誠如他當時所言，只要大腦和舌頭還能運作，他就不需要那隻手臂。 他希望能留下豐功偉業。這不一定是一個王朝，儘管他有四個兒子且皆為教士。他考慮更多的是伊斯蘭革命的「第二步」，即更加虔誠、更具活力。顯然，他的時間已經不多了。如果伊朗的敵人發動攻擊，他會被秘密轉移。對於他而言，能飲下這口純淨的殉道之泉，是多麼光榮、多麼配得上未來的樂園。■ --Hosting provided by SoundOn