Show notes
Richard Ned Lebow discusses national defense including deterrence. Lebow is Professor Emeritus of International Political Theory in the Department of War Studies, King's College London and James O. Freedman Presidential Professor Emeritus at Dartmouth. He is also a Honorary Fellow of Pembroke College, University of Cambridge. He has taught strategy at the National and Naval War Colleges and served as a scholar-in-residence in the Central Intelligence Agency during the Carter administration. He was born in 1941 in France under Nazi occupation and is the only member of his family to have survived World War II. He was adopted by an American family and grew up in New York City. He has written dozens of books including 3 currently under review for publication, one of which is a novel, in addition to hundreds of journal articles. He is interviewed by Doug Samuelson and Spencer Graves.
The lesson of Munich
Lebow says that the so-called "Munich lesson" was coined by Winston Churchill to help ease from power Neville Chamberlain during the "phoney war" following the German invasion of Poland, during which Germany also invaded Norway. After World War II Churchill mentioned Munich, with the tacit support of US President Truman, to win US support for opposing the Soviet Union in Europe. Since the Cold War, it has become a tool of right wing hawks opposed to caution by both Republican and Democratic presidents.
The fundamental problem with the "Munich lesson" is that the use of force creates considerable blowback, which could be dramatically worse than the situation used to justify the use of force to start with. The Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 is one dramatic and well-documented example. Whatever goals were sought, including possibly making the Palestinians, North Koreans, and Iranians more pliant, it did the reverse.
Deterrence
Lebow has published extensively on deterrence, which is based on the assumption that most aggressive behavior in international affairs is opportunity driven. An effective strategy to counter such behavior one must do four things:
Define a commitment.
Communicate that commitment
Have the military capability to respond effectively if needed to uphold that commitment.
Act in ways to make the commitment credible.
This may not deter aggressive behavior driven by need, not opportunity. There's all kinds of empirical evidence that a deterrence strategy is as likely to provoke the behavior it seeks to prevent as not.
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is an example. The Soviet Union and the US had each threatened the other. The political leaders in the US believed that Soviet Premier Khrushchev was unhinged and had to be restrained. What US President Kennedy did as a result made Khrushchev feel insecure. Soviet ICBMs too often exploded on the launching pad making them more dangerous to the Soviets than to the US. Khrushchev therefore decided to station more reliable intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba. He did so in secret, fearing the US might intercept them en route otherwise. The secrecy made Kennedy feel threatened. Deterrence as practiced by both sides made the other feel more insecure. Each was convinced that giving in would only invite new challenges, and they had to behave in tough and convincing ways.
During that crisis, there were nuclear tipped US missiles on Taiwan aimed at Chinese mainland targets. The commander of that missile base received what looked like an attack order from CINCPAC, the Commander in Chief Pacific Area Command. He was horrified when he received this, because it involved launching nuclear missiles at Chinese bases and possibly cities. So he didn't do it. Instead he cabled back and asked for clarification. In the interim, one of the officers who was in command of three missiles,
The lesson of Munich
Lebow says that the so-called "Munich lesson" was coined by Winston Churchill to help ease from power Neville Chamberlain during the "phoney war" following the German invasion of Poland, during which Germany also invaded Norway. After World War II Churchill mentioned Munich, with the tacit support of US President Truman, to win US support for opposing the Soviet Union in Europe. Since the Cold War, it has become a tool of right wing hawks opposed to caution by both Republican and Democratic presidents.
The fundamental problem with the "Munich lesson" is that the use of force creates considerable blowback, which could be dramatically worse than the situation used to justify the use of force to start with. The Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 is one dramatic and well-documented example. Whatever goals were sought, including possibly making the Palestinians, North Koreans, and Iranians more pliant, it did the reverse.
Deterrence
Lebow has published extensively on deterrence, which is based on the assumption that most aggressive behavior in international affairs is opportunity driven. An effective strategy to counter such behavior one must do four things:
Define a commitment.
Communicate that commitment
Have the military capability to respond effectively if needed to uphold that commitment.
Act in ways to make the commitment credible.
This may not deter aggressive behavior driven by need, not opportunity. There's all kinds of empirical evidence that a deterrence strategy is as likely to provoke the behavior it seeks to prevent as not.
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is an example. The Soviet Union and the US had each threatened the other. The political leaders in the US believed that Soviet Premier Khrushchev was unhinged and had to be restrained. What US President Kennedy did as a result made Khrushchev feel insecure. Soviet ICBMs too often exploded on the launching pad making them more dangerous to the Soviets than to the US. Khrushchev therefore decided to station more reliable intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba. He did so in secret, fearing the US might intercept them en route otherwise. The secrecy made Kennedy feel threatened. Deterrence as practiced by both sides made the other feel more insecure. Each was convinced that giving in would only invite new challenges, and they had to behave in tough and convincing ways.
During that crisis, there were nuclear tipped US missiles on Taiwan aimed at Chinese mainland targets. The commander of that missile base received what looked like an attack order from CINCPAC, the Commander in Chief Pacific Area Command. He was horrified when he received this, because it involved launching nuclear missiles at Chinese bases and possibly cities. So he didn't do it. Instead he cabled back and asked for clarification. In the interim, one of the officers who was in command of three missiles,