This paper is about whether it is rational to intrinsically desire the vague. A proposition is inconsequential if neither it, nor its negation is rational to intrinsically desire. The objects of intrinsic desire are propositions, and the contradictory of propositional vagueness is propositional precision. Every vague proposition is not precise, and every precise proposition is not vague. The question to be pursued thus can be posed as follows: is every consequential proposition precise?
Jack Spencer is Associate Professor of Philosophy at MIT. Before doing his PhD at Princeton, he studied philosophy and economics at University of Colorado, Boulder. Much of his research has been in metaphysics and decision theory. He is currently thinking about instantaneous rates-of-change, fundamentality, rationality and vagueness.
This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Spencer's talk - "Intrinsically Desiring the Vague" - at the Aristotelian Society on 21st March 2022. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.