Hey, this is Joel.

I’m sitting next to a pile of flowers in the yard.

I spent some time this morning taking hops vines out of our hoop house, and now I’m sitting on a bucket, picking the flowers off the vines.

A buddy of mine brews beer. Sometimes he gives me some of it, so I’m going to give him a bunch of these.

I grow several different varieties of hops in the hoop house. I’ve got some New Zealand varieties, some Cascade, and some Chinook. The Chinook seems to yield better than anything else I’ve tried here at high altitude.

If you’ve never smelled a hop flower before, go get yourself a good, fresh West Coast IPA and really smell it before you drink it.

That smell is hops.

A West Coast IPA is usually very hop-forward, and when you break one of these fresh flowers open, there’s this strong green, citrusy, resinous smell. You immediately think, that smells like an IPA.

Except it’s really the other way around.

The IPA smells like this flower.

My hands are busy, so I obviously can’t type anything. I’m sitting here talking to my phone instead.

And with my hands busy, I’ve had some time to think about a few things from this week, even though I haven’t had time to write them down.

The first one is cattle.

I made a trip this week to the Buffalo Livestock Market up in northern Wyoming, and one of the things that stood out was the number of heifers.

For people who don’t spend much time around cattle, a heifer is a young female that hasn’t had her first calf yet. If you want to grow a cow herd, you have to keep some of those young females. You breed them. They have calves. They become cows.

That sounds simple enough.

Except right now those heifers are worth a tremendous amount of money.

An individual heifer can bring something like $2,500.

If you keep her, maybe she has ten or twelve or fifteen calves over the course of her life. Maybe keeping her turns out to be a tremendous investment.

But maybe cattle prices fall.

Maybe three years from now you look back and realize somebody was willing to hand you $2,500 for that animal and you turned it down.

And meanwhile, you have to feed her.

You have to carry her through the winter. You have to buy hay. You have to buy fuel. You have all the other expenses that come with running a ranch.

That was another thing people were talking about at the livestock market. Everybody hopes we get a lot of snow this winter.

Snow means moisture. Moisture means grass.

And grass matters because hay is expensive.

Fuel is expensive.

When diesel is expensive, even if there’s hay somewhere else, getting it to your ranch gets expensive in a hurry.

So there’s this national conversation about the cattle herd being historically small and ranchers needing to retain heifers so we can rebuild it.

But an individual rancher doesn’t operate the national cattle herd.

He operates his ranch.

He has bills. He has input costs. And he has an animal standing in front of him that somebody is willing to pay a lot of money for right now.

Sometimes people ask why ranchers don’t just keep more heifers.

Sometimes they can’t afford to.

And sitting here picking hops, I realized I’ve got a pretty good example right in front of me.

I’ve got thousands of these flowers.

Suppose somebody came along and offered me a nickel or a dime for every one of them.

At some point, the price might get high enough that I wouldn’t keep any to brew beer myself.

I’d sell them.

Not because I suddenly stopped liking beer.

Not because I don’t know they might be useful later.

The price somebody is willing to give me today changes the decision.

That’s basically the position ranchers are in.

The price can get high enough that you almost can’t afford not to sell the animal you would otherwise like to keep.

The second thing I’ve been thinking about is Iran.

Part of the reason I think about Iran more than most people probably do is my previous life working around nuclear weapons and strategy.

And I keep coming back to the idea that maybe we are just too impatient with Iran.

We want problems solved. We want regimes to change. We want countries to behave differently.

But Iran isn’t a new country.

Persia is one of the oldest civilizations in the world.

There’s a story about Alexander the Great that I keep thinking about.

Go back to 334 B.C.

Alexander is about twenty-two years old. He crosses into Asia with a Macedonian army and takes on the Persian Empire, one of the great powers of the ancient world.

And then he starts winning.

He defeats Persian armies. He defeats Darius III. He pushes deeper and deeper into the empire.

Eventually he gets through the Persian Gates and reaches Persepolis, the ceremonial heart of Persia.

Parts of Persepolis are burned.

So if you stop the story there, Alexander conquered Persia.

He did.

But then something interesting starts happening.

Alexander begins adopting elements of Persian royal dress. He brings Persian nobles into his government. He brings Persian soldiers into his army. He marries into the Persian royal family. He encourages his officers to marry Persian women.

And his Macedonian soldiers hate it.

They marched across the known world to conquer Persia, and now they’re looking at their king thinking, wait a minute.

We conquered them.

Why are you starting to look like them?

Persia could obviously be conquered.

Alexander did it.

But there’s something remarkable about a civilization that can lose the war and still influence the conqueror so deeply that the conqueror begins changing himself.

Alexander conquered Persia.

And then Persia changed Alexander.

I think we ought to remember that.

We don’t have to be Iran’s friend.

We don’t have to accept Iran possessing nuclear weapons.

We don’t have to accept attacks on shipping or attacks on its neighbors through militias and proxies.

But maybe we should stop assuming that the final answer is somehow to make Iran into us.

We’ve tried versions of that before.

In 1953, the United States became involved in the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and helped restore the Shah’s position.

Over the next couple of decades, the United States became very closely associated with the Shah while he pursued rapid modernization, military expansion, and increasingly authoritarian rule.

It’s probably too simple to say America was trying to make Iran culturally American.

But we were deeply involved in determining who governed Iran and what direction the country would take.

And eventually there was a backlash.

The Iranian Revolution in 1979 had a lot of causes. Religion mattered. Economics mattered. Political repression mattered. The Shah mattered. Foreign interference mattered.

And out of that revolution came a phrase Americans still recognize immediately.

Death to America.

Maybe there’s a lesson in that.

Iran does not have to become us.

We can deter Iran.

We can contain Iran.

We can protect our allies.

We can oppose nuclear proliferation.

We can respond when American troops or American interests are attacked.

But those things are different from assuming we are going to redesign Iranian society.

Even negotiating with Iran is complicated.

Iran has several centers of political power. The elected government handles diplomacy and much of the ordinary work of government. But the Supreme Leader has the final say on the biggest national-security questions, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps answers to him, not to the elected president.

So when an Iranian diplomat sits across the table from an American diplomat and signs something, the question isn’t just whether we got a signature.

The question is whether the person across the table actually has the authority to bind the parts of the Iranian system that have the missiles, the ships, and the guns.

Does the Supreme Leader support the agreement?

Does the security establishment consider itself bound by it?

Will the Revolutionary Guard carry it out?

You can have diplomacy happening in one place while military pressure continues or resumes somewhere else.

That doesn’t necessarily mean the Iranian diplomats are fake, and it doesn’t mean the Revolutionary Guard is some completely separate rogue government.

It means we need to understand who actually has authority before we congratulate ourselves for reaching an agreement.

And maybe the broader point is just patience.

Patience isn’t the same thing as weakness.

Sometimes patience means understanding the civilization in front of you well enough not to expect it to become something it isn’t.

Anyway, I’m still sitting here picking hops.

They’re going into a silver metal bucket.

When I’m done, I’m going to spread them out on a screen, let them dry for a couple of days, and then freeze them.

And while I’ve been doing that, I’ve also been thinking about Russia.

I read a piece this morning in the Wall Street Journal about something Russia has become very good at doing.

Russia takes actions against NATO countries that seem deliberately designed to stay just below the point where everybody immediately agrees an armed attack has taken place.

Cyber operations.

Sabotage.

Electronic interference.

Disinformation.

Using proxies.

Border pressure.

Things that can create real damage without a Russian tank necessarily crossing a NATO border.

And that creates a strange problem for NATO.

Article 5 says an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all.

But real life is messier.

Something gets sabotaged.

Who did it?

Can you prove it?

Was it an armed attack?

Was it espionage?

Was it a criminal act?

Was it a proxy?

How much evidence do you need before you respond?

And if you respond militarily, are you defending yourself or escalating something that was intentionally designed to sit below that threshold?

Russia may not just be testing NATO’s military strength.

It may be testing NATO’s decision-making machinery.

From Moscow’s point of view, the ideal action might be something serious enough to frighten people and impose costs, but ambiguous enough that thirty-two NATO governments spend the next two weeks arguing over what exactly happened.

I think we make a mistake if we assume there are only two possible responses.

Do nothing.

Or go to war.

There is a lot of room between those two things.

And geography gives NATO some choices.

One place Americans don’t talk about very much is Kaliningrad.

Kaliningrad is a small piece of Russian territory on the Baltic Sea, physically separated from the rest of Russia.

It sits between Poland and Lithuania.

Both are NATO countries.

Kaliningrad is extremely important to Russia. It is home to major Russian military forces and Russia’s Baltic Fleet. It gives Russia a powerful position in the Baltic.

But that geography also makes it vulnerable.

It is Russian territory surrounded on land by NATO.

And some of the land transit between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad crosses NATO territory.

So if Russia wants to operate in the gray zone, NATO doesn’t necessarily have to answer every provocation by firing a missile.

There are economic tools.

There are diplomatic tools.

There are transit rules.

There are inspections.

There are sanctions.

There are ways to increase pressure gradually.

You could imagine a ladder.

Russia takes some deliberate action against NATO infrastructure.

NATO responds by tightening restrictions.

Russia escalates.

NATO tightens them further.

At the far end of that ladder, you could even start discussing suspension of some rail transit.

The United States cannot simply close a railroad through Lithuania.

It is Lithuanian territory. European Union law matters. Our allies matter.

And completely closing access would be a very serious escalation.

But that’s exactly why it can matter as leverage.

Deterrence works when the other side knows there are things it values that can be put at risk.

Kaliningrad is a Russian strength.

It is also a Russian vulnerability.

And if a new American president really wants to understand Russia, I think one of the first places he or she ought to go is Finland.

Go to Finland and listen.

Finland shares about 830 miles of border with Russia.

The Finns have lived next to Russia for generations.

They have fought Russia.

They have negotiated with Russia.

They have traded with Russia.

They have deterred Russia.

They built their military and a lot of their civil preparedness around the fact that Russia is going to remain next door no matter who happens to be sitting in the Kremlin.

There’s something we can learn from that.

Sometimes Americans think distance gives us objectivity.

Sometimes distance just gives us distance.

If you want to understand somebody, listen to the people who have to live next door to them.

That doesn’t mean Finland is always right.

It doesn’t mean Poland is always right.

It doesn’t mean the Baltic states are always right.

But their experience matters.

We shouldn’t decide what Russia means from Washington and then call our European allies afterward to explain our decision to them.

We should listen first.

Sometimes the people who understand a rival best are the people who have had to live next door to it.

And then there was one other thing from this week that has almost nothing to do with Iran or Russia.

I went to a University of Wyoming football game Saturday.

Wyoming played Hawai‘i.

We recently dropped our oldest off at the University of Wyoming. Three weeks ago, maybe a month ago.

It was great to see them.

And it got me thinking about college.

A lot of people are worried about college right now.

And I understand why.

College is expensive.

Private universities can be extraordinarily expensive.

Tuition has increased tremendously over the last several decades.

And young people are looking at those numbers and asking a pretty reasonable question.

Is this worth it?

I think there was probably a period when too many people treated college as automatic.

You graduated from high school, so you went to college.

Nobody stopped to ask what you were studying.

Nobody stopped to ask what the degree cost.

Nobody stopped to ask what kind of job it might lead to.

Nobody stopped to ask how much debt you would have when you finished.

We should think about all of those things.

But I wonder if we’re starting to swing too far in the other direction.

Now there’s a growing cultural message that college just isn’t worth it.

If you’re seventeen or eighteen years old, I’d be very careful about letting that cultural mood make the decision for you.

When everybody starts moving in one direction, that’s usually a good time to stop and ask whether that direction makes sense for you.

That doesn’t mean every kid should go to college.

Absolutely not.

There are great careers that don’t require a four-year degree.

There are trades that pay extremely well.

There are people who would be much better off becoming electricians, plumbers, welders, mechanics, or entrepreneurs than borrowing a hundred thousand dollars for a degree they don’t need.

But the opposite is also true.

If you can get a useful degree in a field where there is demand, at a price you can reasonably afford, and you have a good chance of finishing it, that can still be a very good investment.

The question isn’t whether college is good or bad.

It’s what are you trying to do?

What education does that require?

What will it cost?

And what are you likely to get in return?

Don’t go to college just because everybody else went.

But don’t refuse to go because everybody around you suddenly decided college is a scam either.

Make your own decision.

And maybe that’s what all of these things I’ve been thinking about this week have in common.

The cattle market.

Iran.

Russia.

College.

The easy answer is usually the one everybody repeats.

Keep the heifers and rebuild the herd.

Make Iran more like us.

Either ignore Russia or go to war with Russia.

College is always worth it.

College is never worth it.

But reality is usually more complicated than that.

The rancher has to make payroll.

Iran has thousands of years of history.

Russia understands geography.

And an eighteen-year-old has to live with their own decision long after everybody giving them advice has moved on to something else.

Maybe the lesson from this week is just to slow down a little.

Understand the incentives.

Understand the history.

Understand the geography.

Listen to people who know something you don’t.

Then make your own decision.

Anyway, I’m still picking hops.

I keep looking down at this bucket wondering when it’s ever going to be full.

It’s like an infinite bucket.

It never fills up.

So I’ve still got plenty of flowers left to pick.

Thanks to you all for keeping me company while I sit on this bucket and pick flowers.

Sources

Cattle / heifer retention

USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, United States cattle inventory down slightly — Jan. 30, 2026. This supports the small national herd and current inventory context. USDA NASS

USDA Economic Research Service, Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry Outlook: February 2026. This is especially useful because it specifically discusses beef replacement heifers and says sustained heifer retention is needed before the beef cow herd can expand. Economic Research Service

USDA ERS, Livestock Production Cycles Affect Long-Term Price Outlook for Cattle, Hogs, and Chickens. Good background on the cattle cycle, historically low inventories, and why low supplies produce high cattle prices. Economic Research Service

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly Retail Gasoline and Diesel Prices. Useful for the high-diesel-cost portion; national on-highway diesel was above $6.50 per gallon in the week of Sept. 21, 2026. U.S. Energy Information Administration

Alexander and Persia

Alexander the Great, World History Encyclopedia. Covers Alexander’s effort to integrate Macedonian and Persian elites, the Susa marriages, his marriage to a daughter of Darius III, adoption of Persian dress and manners, incorporation of Persians into the military, and Macedonian resistance to those policies. World History Encyclopedia

Alexander the Great & the Burning of Persepolis, World History Encyclopedia. Useful for the conquest and destruction of Persepolis. World History Encyclopedia

1953 Iran coup / the Shah

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran, 1951–1954. A 1954 CIA memorandum explicitly describes the U.S.-approved campaign to remove Mossadegh and replace his government with a pro-Western government under the Shah. Office of the Historian

The same official documentary collection includes Eisenhower acknowledging that the United States helped bring about Mossadegh’s removal and the Shah’s restoration. Office of the Historian

There are also contemporary CIA communications describing direct American support for the Shah during the operation. Office of the Historian

Iranian political structure / IRGC

Council on Foreign Relations, The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It explains that the IRGC answers directly to the Supreme Leader and that its command structure bypasses the elected president. It also covers the IRGC’s military, political, economic, and regional roles. Council on Foreign Relations

Russia / NATO gray-zone activity

NATO, Collective defence and Article 5. Particularly important because NATO explicitly says an “armed attack” is assessed case by case and that sufficiently serious cyber and other hybrid attacks can qualify under Article 5. NATO

Kaliningrad

Council of the European Union, EU sanctions against Russia: questions and answers. Useful for the legal and logistical reality of Kaliningrad transit; EU sanctions make specific provisions for goods moving between Russia and the Kaliningrad oblast. Council of the European Union

NATO material describes Kaliningrad as a Russian exclave on the Baltic surrounded by Lithuania and Poland and discusses the importance of civilian and military transit. NATO

Finland

NATO material gives Finland’s land border with Russia as about 1,340 kilometers, or roughly 830 miles. NATO

College costs and value

College Board, Trends in College Pricing and Student Aid 2025. This is probably your best source for tuition, sticker prices, net prices, financial aid, and the long-term cost discussion. College Board Research

College Board’s archive gives you historical reports back through the 1990s if you want to make a precise claim about thirty-year tuition growth rather than simply saying college has become expensive. College Board Research

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Education pays, 2025. In 2025, workers with bachelor’s degrees had median weekly earnings of $1,578 and a 2.8% unemployment rate, with earnings generally increasing and unemployment generally declining as educational attainment rose. Bureau of Labor Statistics