You’re gassing up at a Flying J just west of Rawlins, Wyoming, and the wind is having its way with you.
The gusts come off the high plains at sixty miles an hour, shoving your truck door open, ripping it from your hand. Down the interstate you passed two semis on their sides, lying in the median like dead animals. Strange lattice fences line the highway; if you’re not from here you don’t know they’re snow fences. They’re losing. Truckers and old wise ones call this stretch the Snow Chi Minh Trail. They’re not joking.
You squeeze the pump handle and watch the numbers climb. You do the math without meaning to. You watch the bill tick higher. Higher.
A refinery sits less than two hours west of here in Sinclair. You can see the stacks from the highway. Wyoming pumps oil. Wyoming refines oil. And somehow the number on this pump is set by a war seven thousand miles away in a gulf that doesn’t get cold like this.
Why?
The easy answer is oil. That’s the answer they give you on television. But it’s not the real answer. The real answer is older, stranger, and closer to your life than you’ve been told.
It’s a trap.
Act I. The Architecture
Before we get to the gas pump, we need to go back. Five scenes. Each one has men in it making decisions, and those decisions still set the price on that pump in Rawlins.
Scene one. Tehran, 1953. The smell of summer dust.
Mohammad Mosaddegh is Iran’s constitutionally appointed prime minister. He has overwhelming democratic parliamentary support. An old man with a long face who sometimes wept in parliament and received foreign dignitaries in his pajamas from bed. The British thought he was mad. Crazy. He was not mad.
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which you know today as BP, had been pumping Iranian crude for decades and paying Iran pennies on the dollar for it. Mosaddegh asked to audit the books. The British refused. So he kicked them out.
They would not go quietly.
British intelligence drew up a plan to remove Mosaddegh. They called it Operation Boot. But Mosaddegh had expelled British diplomats and intelligence officers along with the oilmen. The British spy agency MI6 had no one left in the country. They couldn’t do it alone.
So they went to Washington. The Truman administration said no. But in January 1953, Eisenhower took office, and the British changed the sales pitch. They stopped talking about oil and started talking about communism. Iran was unstable. The Soviet Union was circling. It was a Cold War argument built for a Cold War president. Eisenhower approved the operation. Allen Dulles at CIA set the budget at a million dollars. And the man they chose to run it was Kermit Roosevelt.
In July, Roosevelt crossed the Iranian border in the back seat of a car. He was the grandson of Teddy Roosevelt. A bureaucrat’s face. Black glasses. High forehead. A colleague once called him the last person you’d expect to be up to his neck in dirty tricks. That colleague was Kim Philby, the most famous double agent in British history.
Roosevelt was a career spy and he had come to overthrow a government.
He carried with him a million dollars in cash and a plan called Operation Ajax. He was later asked on camera whether the million dollars was real. Yes, he said. Though he only spent a fraction of it.
The plan was to buy crowds and make it look like the Iranian people wanted their prime minister gone. The first attempt failed. Mosaddegh’s people arrested the Shah’s messenger before he could deliver the decree. The Shah, who was supposed to be the face of the new order, panicked and flew to Rome. CIA headquarters cabled Roosevelt to stop. Come home. It’s over.
Roosevelt read the cable and said no. We’re not done here.
The next day, paid crowds poured out of southern Tehran shouting for the Shah. Soldiers joined them. By the end of the day, the people had overrun Mosaddegh’s house; he had fallen, and the path was open for the Shah’s long authoritarian rule. A twenty-six-year dictatorship had begun.
The Shah told Roosevelt, “I owe my throne to God, my people, and to you.”
Some years later, Washington helped him build SAVAK. His secret police. CIA-trained, American-designed, and for a quarter century one of the most efficient instruments of surveillance and torture in the Middle East. The Shah kept the oil flowing west. Washington kept quiet. This arrangement held for twenty-six years.
There was no congressional vote on any of it. No treaty. No debate. The coup was not about oil alone. But without oil, there is no coup story to tell.
Remember this scene. We’ll come back to it.
Scene two. Camp David, in the Maryland woods.
August 13, 1971. A Friday. Richard Nixon has called his inner circle to the presidential retreat. They arrive quietly. No press. Some of the men in the room do not know why they’ve been summoned until they get there.
The problem. After World War II the victorious allies built a monetary system called Bretton Woods. It was elegant and it was fragile. They pegged the dollar to gold at thirty-five dollars per ounce. Every other currency, pegged to the dollar. Any foreign central bank could present dollars at the Treasury window and receive gold in return. The system made the dollar the foundation of the world economy. It worked as long as America didn’t print more dollars than it had gold to cover.
And then America printed more dollars than it had gold to cover. Vietnam. The Great Society. The space race. By 1971 there were far more dollars in foreign hands than there was gold in the vault. The reserves had fallen to ten billion dollars against forty billion in foreign liabilities.
Frenchman Charles de Gaulle saw it first, or at least said it loudest. He had long resented what France called America’s exorbitant privilege, the power to print the world’s money and spend it however it wished while other nations held the paper. In 1965 France began converting dollar reserves into gold and pressing the United States where Bretton Woods was weakest. Other countries followed. The gold was physically leaving.
Inside Camp David that weekend the arguments ran hot. Arthur Burns, the Federal Reserve chairman, worried about America’s word. The country had made a promise. You could exchange dollars for gold. Breaking that promise would shatter trust in the international system. John Connally, the Treasury Secretary, did not much care about trust. He was a Texan. He wanted to close the window and use the crisis as a club to force other countries to revalue their currencies upward. Paul Volcker, undersecretary for monetary affairs, was somewhere between. He understood the necessity but feared the disorder. George Shultz, the budget director and a student of Milton Friedman, had the most radical view. Let it all float. No more fixed rates. Let the market decide what a dollar is worth.
Nixon listened to all of them but cared about one thing. How would it play with the American public on Monday morning?
On Sunday evening, August 15, the president went on national television. He announced that the United States would no longer honor the Bretton Woods commitment. The gold window was closed. Dollars could no longer be exchanged for gold. He did not ask Congress. He did not consult allies. He did not warn them.
America’s allies woke up Monday morning to a unilateral break in the postwar monetary order. The promise was broken.
Every finance minister on earth asked the same question. If the dollar wasn’t worth gold, what was it worth?
Temporary answers came fast, but none held. The dollar fell. Inflation climbed. The international monetary system drifted without an anchor.
Then the answer arrived. Not from a conference room. From a war.
Scene three. An American gas station in October 1973.
Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on Yom Kippur. The United States airlifted weapons to Israel. The Arab producers announced an oil embargo against the United States and its allies.
America discovered a critical share of its energy depende…
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